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Abstract 
Many conservation interventions aim to influence people’s behaviour. Success 
depends upon a proper understanding of what motivates behaviour. I begin by 
reviewing social psychological models of behaviour, discussing how social 
psychological predictors of behaviour have been studied within conservation. Many 
studies focus on general attitudes towards conservation, rather than attitudes 
towards specific behaviours impacting on conservation success, assuming general 
attitudes are a useful indicator of behaviour, despite mixed evidence.  
Interventions depending upon rules require information about the quantity of people, 
and the types of people, breaking rules. However, when the subject of investigation 
is sensitive because it is illegal or socially taboo, it is naive to expect that people will 
respond honestly to questions about rule breaking when asked directly. Specialised 
methods exist for investigating sensitive topics yet are rarely used within 
conservation. I provide evidence that the randomised response technique (RRT) 
produces more accurate estimates of illicit behaviours compared to conventional 
surveys. Further, I show that RRT can be adapted to investigate how non-sensitive 
social psychological characteristics of respondents, such as their attitudes towards 
specific conservation-related behaviours, can be linked to their behaviour. This paves 
the way for using RRT to test the effectiveness of innocuous questions as proxy 
indicators for people’s involvement in illicit behaviours.  
There has been concern that sanctions for wildlife crimes do not reflect how serious 
crimes are in terms of illegal profits or the threat status of targeted species. 
Sanctions should reflect how serious a crime is, whilst being socially acceptable. I use 
conjoint analysis to understand public and professional opinions as to which aspects 
of wildlife crimes make them more or less serious, and so deserving of a greater or 
lesser sentence. Results highlight the gravity judiciaries place on illegal profits when 
setting sentences. Finally, to understand how sanctions relate to species threat 
status, I analyse 23 years of wildlife crime sanctioning from the United Kingdom 
providing evidence that sanction severity increases with threat status and 
corresponding legal protection.  
This thesis is an example of how expanding our knowledge beyond traditional 
academic boundaries can enhance the development of conservation science.
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1.1 Background 
Biodiversity loss is largely the result of human activities. Overexploitation, habitat 
loss, and climate change are all causing species declines, and in some instances 
extinctions (Schipper et al. 2008; Sodhi et al. 2008). Because human activities are 
the main driver of biodiversity loss, influencing people’s behaviours must form part of 
the solution. Different approaches attempting to influence conservation-related 
behaviours have been, and continue to be applied in the field. For example positive 
incentives offer rewards to individuals or communities for behaving in certain ways; 
and different livelihood options are promoted to reduce the attractiveness of 
environmentally harmful behaviours (Milner-Gulland and Rowcliffe 2007). In addition 
campaigns seek to influence attitudes and public opinion towards environmentally 
sensitive behaviours making them socially costly (e.g. anti-fur campaigns of the 
1980s; Simonson 2001); and enforcement efforts monitor adherence to rules and 
punish rule breakers to encourage compliance (Keane et al. 2008). No single 
approach is a panacea for successful conservation, and many conservation 
interventions combine positive incentives (which reward conservation), negative 
incentives (which punish environmental damage) and approaches aiming to change 
attitudes or social acceptability of behaviours (Emerton 1999). However, with 
conservation funds limited (James et al. 1999), efforts must be made to identify 
which approaches are theoretically most likely to be effective. This requires that 
conservationists expand their understanding of what motivates behaviour. To this 
end, conservationists have much to learn from other disciplines which have 
developed theories of human decision making. 
Successfully influencing human behaviour depends upon a proper understanding of 
what motivates the specific behaviour of interest (Vlek and Steg 2007). Bioeconomic 
models, grounded in rational choice theory, have proved useful for investigating how 
individuals may change their behaviour in response to changing circumstances, such 
as fluctuations in the market price of bushmeat or agricultural produce, in ways 
which may not have been foreseen (Damania et al. 2005). However, social 
psychological models of human behaviour have not been as widely applied in 
resource management. That is not to say that social psychological characteristics 
have not received attention. Indeed there is a wealth of knowledge concerning the 
importance of social norms (including taboos) governed by informal institutions in 
influencing resource use behaviour of groups and individuals (Agrawal and Gibson 
1999; Colding and Folke 2001; Jones et al. 2008a; Ostrom 2000). Attitude has also 
received considerable attention with studies frequently measuring attitudes towards 
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wildlife conservation, assuming attitude to be a useful proxy for pro-conservation 
behaviours (Holmes 2003). However, evidence from conservation and resource 
management studies suggest that attitude alone is a poor indicator of behaviour 
(Infield and Namara 2001; Waylen et al. 2009) suggesting there is potential to 
improve research in this area.  
Approaches to conservation which depend upon rules to restrict certain activities 
such as poaching (Jachmann 2008) or logging (Jepson et al. 2001) require 
information on levels of rules breaking, and characteristics of rule breakers in order 
to design and target interventions aimed at improving compliance (Gavin et al. 
2010). Remote sensing is a powerful technique for assessing the extent of land-use 
change over large spatial areas and it has been used to assess the level and extent 
of illegal deforestation in many countries (Kuemmerle et al. 2007; Laurance et al. 
2001). However, it is not possible to detect all types of human disturbances with 
such technology, for example the harvesting of non-timber forest products or 
defaunation of forests could occur undetected (Peres et al. 2006). Other indirect 
methods for assessing illegal resource use including surveys of snares, bushmeat at 
markets, and transects recording timber removal from forests have been discussed 
by Gavin et al. (2010). Whilst each of these methods reveals information about the 
extent of illegal activities, they tell us little about the characteristics, or quantity of 
people breaking rules. This has management implications; in the absence of direct 
knowledge of rule breakers, managers have a limited ability to design or target 
interventions to change behaviour. Unfortunately, questioning people directly about 
sensitive topics such as rule breaking is problematic as providing honest information 
may hold undesirable consequences for some (Lee 1993). Specialised methods for 
asking people directly about their involvement in sensitive behaviours have been 
developed (e.g. Warner 1965; Miller 1985), but rarely have they been used to assess 
rule breaking in conservation. Research in this area could benefit from studies which 
compare estimates obtained across multiple methods, and unique applications of 
methods specifically developed for investigating sensitive topics (Gavin et al. 2010). 
The failure of the death penalty to control poaching of elephant ivory and rhino horns 
in some African states illustrates how the stiffest penalty possible, alone, is not an 
effective deterrent (Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland 1993). Law enforcement has 
two main components: efforts aimed at detecting illegal activities, and systems for 
punishing detected criminals; both components are required for successful natural 
resource management (Keane et al. 2008). For example, rules alone do not change 
behaviour; under conditions of limited enforcement commercial hunters in the 
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Democratic Republic of Congo did not alter their prey-selection choices in order to 
avoid taking legally protected species (Rowcliffe et al. 2004); and poaching from the 
Serengeti National Park, Tanzania increased during a period of low enforcement, but 
declined in response to increased enforcement effort (Hilborn et al. 2006). Sanctions 
awarded for criminal acts should punish offenders, conveying the degree of public 
disapproval, and create deterrence (Von Hirsch and Roberts 2004). However, wildlife 
crime in general is under researched (Wilson-Wilde 2010); there is limited empirical 
analysis regarding sanctions awarded for wildlife crimes, and concern among 
conservationists that sanctions fail to reflect conservation impact, and may be 
insufficient to create deterrence (Chaber et al. 2010; Eagle and Betters 1998; House 
of Commons 2004). In order to understand the sanctioning of wildlife crimes 
conservationists must understand the various characteristics of defendants which 
judiciaries consider when setting sentences (Sentencing Guidelines Council 2008); 
and understand how courts assess how serious a crime was, particularly as judicial 
assessments of wildlife crime seriousness are likely to differ from that of 
conservationists. 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
This thesis is presented in two parts. In Part One I aim to increase the 
understanding of social psychological influences on human decision making and how 
they have been investigated in the context of conservation and natural resource 
management. In addition I aim to investigate novel methods for assessing people’s 
involvement in wildlife crimes, and to test the potential of non-sensitive social 
psychological indicators at predicting peoples’ rule breaking behaviour. In Part Two I 
aim to investigate opinions towards the sanctioning of wildlife crimes, and how 
awarded sanctions relate to the conservation impact of offences. I address a number 
of gaps in the literature concerning: the way in which indicators of behaviour are 
studied in conservation; the evaluation of novel methods for assessing rule breaking; 
linking attitude (and other indicators) to actual behaviour; and the application of 
sanctions to wildlife crimes. 
My specific objectives are: 
• To explore the use of social psychological indicators of behaviour in 
conservation; 
• To evaluate the strengths and limitations of novel methods for directly 
investigating sensitive behaviours in conservation; 
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• To evaluate the effectiveness of non-sensitive characteristics, such as 
attitude, at predicting people’s involvement in sensitive behaviours; 
• To evaluate what makes a wildlife crime serious in the eyes of the public, 
the courts, and conservationists; and 
• To investigate sanctioning of wildlife crimes in an established judicial 
system. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
In addition to this introduction, Part 1 of this thesis presents three chapters. In 
Chapter 2 I examine social psychology theories of human decision making and 
review how social psychological predictors of behaviour have been used in the 
context of conservation and natural resource management. In Chapter 3 I discuss 
some of the difficulties associated with directly investigating illegal or otherwise 
sensitive topics by gathering data directly from groups of people, some of whom may 
be rule breakers. Using rule breaking among fly fishers in north Wales as a case 
study I test two methods specifically designed for collecting sensitive data (the 
randomised response technique (RRT) and the nominative technique), against a 
conventional self-complete questionnaire. The relative strengths and limitations of 
each method are discussed. Chapter 4 expands the application of RRT to resource 
management problems beyond that of simply estimating the population-level 
prevalence of rule breaking. In this chapter I test the potential of non-sensitive 
indicators (including attitudes, and estimates of peer-behaviour) at predicting rule 
breaking behaviour as reported through RRT using a case study of carnivore killing 
by farmers in north-eastern provinces of South Africa.  
Part 2 presents two data chapters and the Discussion chapter which draws this 
thesis together. In Chapter 5 I investigate the opinions of different groups of people 
towards a policy issue: the sentencing of wildlife trade crimes. Using conjoint 
analysis, a method used in marketing to understand which characteristics of a 
product are preferred by consumers, I investigate which characteristics of wildlife 
trade crimes (threat status and taxa of species involved, illegal profit, previous 
convictions, and plea) conservation professionals, magistrates and the public 
consider most important when asked to make sentencing decisions. Chapter 6 
investigates how sanctions awarded for wildlife crimes prosecuted in the United 
Kingdom over a 23 year period from 1987 to 2010 relate to the protection status of 
the targeted species. In Chapter 7 I discuss the results of this thesis, highlighting 
the major contributions it makes to research in assessing and sentencing illegal 
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behaviours in conservation. I also discuss the limitations of the work included in the 
thesis and suggest how research in this area may continue to develop.  
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2.1 Introduction  
Over the past decades biodiversity conservation has received increasing attention: 
protected area coverage has increased (Chape et al. 2005), and to date 193 nations 
have signed the United Nation’s Convention on Biological Diversity (UNEP 2010). 
Despite this increased profile, funding shortfalls remain (James et al. 1999) and 
overexploitation (Rosser and Mainka 2002), habitat loss (Brooks et al. 2002), 
invasive species (Blackburn et al. 2004; Clavero and García-Berthou 2005) and 
increasingly climate change (Carpenter et al. 2008; Parmesan 2006) continue to 
cause species extinctions (Schipper et al. 2008; Sodhi et al. 2008). The ultimate 
driver of much of the loss in biodiversity is the increasing human population and 
associated consumption (van Vuuren and Bouwman 2005). While population growth 
is a critical issue, it is beyond the scope of most conservation projects which are 
generally concerned with the more proximate drivers of biodiversity loss such as 
resource use. Conservation projects will often seek to alter human behaviour, for 
example encouraging the adoption of agri-environment schemes (Hounsome et al. 
2006); reducing poaching within protected areas (Jachmann 2008); or limiting 
resource extraction (Blank and Gavin 2009; Gelcich et al. 2005). However 
successfully influencing behaviour depends upon the predictors of human behaviour 
being diagnosed correctly (Vlek and Steg 2007). Conservation scientists therefore 
need to be interested in the factors which motivate human behaviour. However many 
of us working within natural resource management and conservation trained as 
biological scientists (Adams 2007). In understanding the complexities involved in 
researching, interpreting and influencing human behaviours we therefore have a lot 
to learn from other disciplines.  
A number of disciplines have offered models of the human decision-making process. 
Institutional analysis offers one way of identifying how the behaviour of a group, or 
individual, is influenced by rules governed by either formal, or informal institutions 
(Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Economic models based upon expected utility theory 
have been applied within natural resource management for many years (Clark 1973; 
Just and Zilberman 1983; May et al. 1979; Rae 1971). A well known example is the 
seminal work by Hardin (1968) which, based upon the assumption that humans seek 
to maximise their utility, explains elegantly why open access resources tend to be 
overexploited. However, humans are not Homo economicus (Persky 1995); purely 
rational beings weighing up the costs and benefits of each and every decision in an 
economic framework. Social psychological characteristics of the decision-maker (for 
example their personal attitudes), and the pressure that they perceive to behave in a 
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certain way (subjective norms) also influence decision making, particularly when 
considering broader decisions such as livelihoods and land use (Rounsevell et al. 
2003; Willock et al. 1999). Such considerations are the realm of social psychologists. 
In this paper we review theories of human decision making from social psychology 
and consider how they have been used in the context of conservation and natural 
resource management highlighting where they could be particularly useful to 
conservation in the future. 
2.2 Social psychological models used to understand human 
behaviour 
The theory of reasoned action and its extension, the theory of planned behaviour, 
(Ajzen 1991; Ajzen and Madden 1986; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) are the models 
most commonly used by social psychologists interested in understanding human 
behaviour. Many studies, where the ultimate objective has been to influence 
behaviour, have used these theories for example: understanding condom use 
(Albarracín et al. 2001); illicit drug use (Conner and McMillan 1999); and drivers’ 
speeding behaviour (Parker et al. 1996). The assumption underlying such studies is 
that an understanding of the predictors of behaviour allow interventions that aim to 
change behaviour to be better designed (Parker 2002). Indeed, a systematic review 
of cases which have applied interventions designed around the findings of theory of 
planned behaviour studies reported that two-thirds of the case-studies recorded 
some behavioural change in the desired direction after the intervention (Hardeman et 
al. 2002).  
Both the theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behaviour are based 
around two assumptions 1) that people evaluate the implications of performing a 
behaviour before deciding to engage, or not engage in it; and 2) that people make 
quite rational decisions based upon a systematic evaluation of information available 
to them (be it correct or not) (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). These assumptions are 
similar to those made in economic models (Blume and Easley 2008) but social 
psychological models use quite different predictors of behaviour. Within the theory of 
reasoned action, both an individual’s attitude towards the behaviour and subjective 
norms influence whether an individual is likely to carry out that behaviour (Figure 
2.1). Attitude is a function of beliefs about the behaviour, and an outcome evaluation 
of performing the behaviour. For example, in a typical survey respondents may be 
asked to score (e.g. on a six point semantic scale; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) a 
‘behavioural belief’ statement: ‘Poaching a duiker will provide meat for my family’. 
This score is multiplied by the respondents’ score to an ‘outcome evaluation’ 
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statement: ‘Eating duiker meat is good for my family’. A subjective norm is what we 
think other people will think of us if we do (or do not do) the behaviour. It is a 
function of normative beliefs and the motivation to comply with what a significant 
person (e.g. village elder, father or religious leader) thinks is appropriate behaviour. 
For example, respondents score a ‘normative belief’ statement: ‘The village elder 
approves of me poaching duiker’. This score is multiplied by the respondents’ score 
to a ‘motivation to comply’ statement: ‘Behaving how the village elder expects me to, 
is important to me’. 
 
Figure 2.1 The theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behaviour. All 
things held equal, the more positive a persons’ attitude, subjective norm and 
perceived behavioural control are, the greater their behavioural intention and thus 
the likelihood that they perform the behaviour (adapted from Vallerand et al. 1992). 
 
For behaviours which are completely under an individual’s control (i.e. depend on 
conscious personal choice rather than external forces) this theory has been proven to 
predict behavioural intention (where an individual is asked whether they plan to carry 
out the behaviour), which has in turn been demonstrated to predict actual behaviour 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Albarracín et al. 2001).  
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The theory of planned behaviour extends this model to include a measure of the 
perceived control over performance of a behaviour, this is known as perceived 
behavioural control (Ajzen 2002). Perceived behavioural control is a function of the 
presence (or absence) of resources (including skills and material items) that facilitate 
performing the behaviour, and the perceived power that each resource has to 
facilitate the behaviour. For example respondents score a ‘control belief’ statement: 
‘It is easy for me to get wire to make snares for poaching Duiker’. This score is 
multiplied by the respondents’ score to a power belief statement: ‘Having access to 
wire makes it likely that I will poach a duiker’. This extension improves the predictive 
power of the model for behaviours which are not completely under an individual’s 
control (Ajzen 1991) (Figure 2.1). The theory of planned behaviour is now the most 
extensively used social psychological model (Hardeman et al. 2002). The relative 
importance of the three predictors (attitudes, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control) tends to differ from one behaviour to another (Ajzen 1991). By 
using this model to investigate why people make specific decisions about a 
behaviour, it is possible to learn which predictor is most important with respect to the 
behaviour of interest (for example turning a non-tree-planting farmer into a tree-
planting farmer; Zubair and Garforth 2006), and therefore which predictor should be 
the target of behaviour-change interventions.  
Some researchers have added other variables to the theory of planned behaviour in 
an attempt to improve the predictive power of the model. Variables that have 
improved the theory of planned behaviour include: anticipated regret (Sheeran and 
Orbell 1999); descriptive norms (how others actually behaviour, rather than what we 
perceive others will think of us) (Rivis and Sheeran 2003); self-efficacy (Armitage et 
al. 1999); and moral obligation (Beck and Ajzen 1991; Conner and Armitage 1998). 
Moral obligation is a person’s own perception of the moral correctness or 
incorrectness of performing a behaviour (Ajzen 1991; Manstead 2000) and so reflects 
another form of social pressure in addition to subjective norms (Conner and Armitage 
1998). Empirical studies which have found moral obligation to be an important 
predictor of behaviours include studies of reckless driving (Manstead and Parker 
1995; Parker et al. 1996), lying (Beck and Ajzen 1991), and cannabis use (Conner 
and McMillan 1999). Moral obligation was also an important predictor of positive pro-
environment behaviours (Bamberg and Möser 2007) including engaging in a recycling 
scheme (Tonglet et al. 2004) and water conservation (Lam 1999).   
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2.3 How have models of behaviour been used in the context of 
conservation? 
There are very few examples where these social psychological models have been 
used within conservation science. The few examples which exist (Aipanjiguly et al. 
2003; Beedell and Rehman 2000; Seeland et al. 2002; Zubair and Garforth 2006) 
have highlighted how information about attitude alone, reveals a limited picture 
concerning the predictors of pro-conservation behaviours. For example farmers who 
had already planted trees on their land, and those who had not, both had a positive 
attitude towards farm forestry suggesting that other factors must influence farmers’ 
decisions to engage in farm forestry (Zubair and Garforth 2006). Subjective norms 
were important in predicting pro-conservation behaviours including: on-farm forestry 
(Zubair and Garforth 2006); on-farm conservation behaviours (including hedgerow 
management and tree planting) (Beedell and Rehman 2000); obeying boating speed 
limits in manatee (Trichechus manatus) areas (Aipanjiguly et al. 2003); and the 
intention to abide by proposed nature reserve rules (Seeland et al. 2002). As a result 
of this theory-based research, the authors cited above could specifically identify 
which person or groups of people (e.g. village elders, family members and friends) 
play a significant role in influencing whether an individual will engage in pro-
conservation behaviours or not. Such information can be exploited for the benefit of 
conservation allowing interventions aimed at changing behaviour to be better 
targeted. 
Perceived behavioural control was also found to be an important predictor in pro-
conservation decision making. For example, Zubair and Garforth (2006) identified 
factors that inhibited people from engaging in on-farm forestry and were then able to 
recommend facilitating factors, such as improved communication about markets, 
establishment of village nurseries, and information about appropriate species, which 
would increase adoption of this pro-conservation behaviour (Zubair and Garforth 
2006). 
Whilst social psychological models have received relatively little attention from 
conservation scientists, some of the predictors of behaviour used in the models have 
been considered independently in a number of conservation studies.  
Attitude studies 
‘Attitude is the psychological tendency of an individual to evaluate an entity (person, 
place, behaviour or thing) with a degree of favour or disfavour’ (Albarracín et al. 
2005). Within conservation there has been a general perception that positive 
Chapter 2. Conservation and human behaviour 
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conservation attitudes, or a positive attitude towards a protected area, are likely to 
be linked to pro-conservation behaviours, and a number of studies have therefore 
investigated attitudes towards conservation (see Holmes 2003 for a review). There 
are very few studies that have put attitudes in the context of other possible 
influences as suggested by the social psychological theories highlighted above, but 
some have linked conservation attitudes to socio-demographic variables, or to 
behaviours which relate to conservation (Table 2.1). 
Studies which have explored the relationships between general attitudes towards 
conservation (or protected areas) and socio-demographic and livelihood variables 
have done so in order to identify which variables determine positive, as opposed to 
negative, attitudes (Arjunan et al. 2006; Mehta and Heinen 2001; Nepal and Weber 
1995). Investigating local attitudes towards conservation near Kalakad–Mundanthurai 
Tiger Reserve in India Arjunan et al. (2006) found that women had more positive 
attitudes towards tiger and forest conservation than men. Further, wealthy residents 
who stood to lose crops to crop raiding animals, the hunting of which is prohibited, 
had a more negative attitude towards tiger conservation than poorer residents who 
did not stand to face such a loss (Arjunan et al. 2006). However, knowing how 
general attitudes are distributed does not necessarily help in the design of 
interventions to change a specific behaviour because a person may have a positive 
attitude to conservation yet still perform behaviours which contradict that attitude 
(for example poach species which are of conservation concern). A number of studies 
have collected data on attitudes towards a protected area or species and concluded 
that respondents hold positive attitudes, yet either do not engage in pro-conservation 
behaviours, or continue to perform behaviours which have negative consequences to 
conservation goals. These finding are largely a result of a mismatch in the 
information collected on attitude and behaviour (see Table 2.1).  
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Such mismatches (e.g. measuring attitude towards conservation, but linking it to a 
specific behaviour such as trespassing in a protected area) limit how useful the 
information can be in informing the design of conservation interventions aimed at 
changing behaviour. For example knowing that crop raiding by wildlife is the cause of 
negative attitudes towards a protected area (de Boer and Baquete 1998) is useful, as 
it may spur a project towards designing ways of deterring crop raiding animals. 
However, such an intervention may be a waste of conservation investment if peoples’ 
negative attitudes towards the protected area never triggered negative behaviours 
towards the protected area (for example in the form of retaliation behaviours). 
Equally, positive attitudes towards a protected area related to perceived benefits and 
good relationships with protected area staff (Fiallo and Jacobson 1995) may not 
mean that people abide by the rules of the protected area. If ensuring local people 
benefit from a protected area improves attitudes but does not increase compliance 
with protected area rules, increasing benefit flows to local people, while important, 
may alone not be the appropriate way of tackling illegal resource extraction.  
Infield and Namara (2001) found that whilst communities around Lake Mburo 
National Park in Uganda that had been subject to a seven year long community 
conservation programme had a more positive attitude towards the park and wildlife 
than communities that had not been included in the programme, behaviour remained 
largely unchanged with high levels of poaching and illegal grazing continuing. Infield 
and Namara (2001) therefore concluded that attitude alone is not an adequate 
predictor of behaviour. Waylen et al. (2009), in their study of attitudes towards two 
critically endangered species; the leatherback turtle (Dermochelys coriacea) and the 
Trinidad piping-guan (Pipile pipile), also reported that attitudes towards conservation 
did not necessarily predict behaviour. Hunting remained a popular pastime even 
among respondents who had a positive attitude towards conservation and recognised 
that hunting threatened conservation (Waylen et al. 2009). However, in both of these 
studies there is a mismatch between the attitude and behaviour investigated; for 
example, Waylen et al. (2009) measured general attitudes towards conservation 
rather than the specific behaviour they were interested in (hunting). 
Investigating general attitudes towards a subject (for example conservation) are 
likely to be of limited use in identifying the predictors of specific behaviours (for 
example poaching) (Ajzen 1991). If the aim is to influence poaching behaviour 
occurring in a park then studies of attitudes need to be clearly focused on attitudes 
towards poaching behaviour, rather than general attitudes towards conservation, or 
other related topics. Conner and Sparks (2008) suggest that one should consider the 
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target, action, context and time scale of a behaviour. For example using the theory of 
planned behaviour we may wish to understand the beliefs underlying the intention to 
poach (action) an elephant (target) from within the protected area (context) in the 
next 12 months (time). Armed only with information on general attitude as currently 
gathered in much conservation research we are lacking behaviour-specific beliefs and 
vital information about social pressure, internalised moral beliefs, and the perceived 
control that people feel they have to engage (or not) in a given behaviour, and the 
relative importance of each of these predictors on actual behaviour. This missing 
knowledge limits our ability to target interventions effectively. Critically, in the 
absence of such knowledge we may threaten locally existing subjective norms which 
also influence human decision making and behaviour. 
Subjective norms: social norms and taboo  
Social psychology emphasises that a person’s behaviour will be influenced by 
subjective norms: the perceived expectations of valued others (Fishbein and Ajzen 
1975). Social norms is a general term for the shared understanding about what 
actions are obligatory, acceptable or forbidden (Ostrom 2000) and includes general 
societal expectations of behaviour (Cialdini and Trost 1998) and standards that 
develop out of observing how others behave (descriptive norms; Cialdini et al. 1990). 
Social norms are enforced through informal institutions, not dependent upon 
government juridical laws (North 1994); for example someone breaking a social 
norm may suffer shame and social rejection (Posner and Rasmusen 1999). 
Behaviours which are particularly unacceptable, perhaps invoking not only the 
displeasure of the community but also of religious entities, may be referred to as a 
taboo (Freud 1950). 
Social norms and taboos help govern traditional systems of natural resource 
management which exist in many non-industrial societies (Berkes et al. 2000). 
Traditional natural resource management has been important in many parts of the 
world for centuries. For example, a system of traditional rules known as sasi, has 
controlled spatial and temporal patterns of fishing and forest product harvesting in 
Maluku, Indonesia, since the 16th century (Harkes and Novaczek 2002). Sami 
reindeer herders of Norway, have similarly well-established traditional institutions to 
control reindeer stocking density on communal lands (Bjørklund 1990). Social norms 
can contribute considerably to the successful management of common-pool resources 
such as farmer-managed irrigation schemes (Ostrom et al. 1999), pasture 
management by nomadic pastoralists (Fernandez-Gimenez 2000); and near-shore 
fisheries of the tropical Pacific islands (Johannes 1982). For example temporal 
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grazing norms control where and when herders in Mongolia can graze their stock, 
and a norm of reciprocity safeguards access between neighbouring herders’ pasture 
in the event of climatic disaster (Fernandez-Gimenez 2000). 
More recently social norms have been shown to be important in predicting re-
enrolment to a payment for ecosystem services scheme (grain-to-green programme, 
in China’s Wolong Nature Reserve; Chen et al. 2009). In a study which used stated 
choice methods to investigate the relative importance of social norms and 
conservation payments, social norms were found to be most important when 
conservation payments were intermediate, and least important at both the lowest 
and highest levels of conservation payment, where none or all of the respondents 
would re-enrol. When offered an intermediate conservation payment, farmers based 
their decisions on what other local farmers were doing: if others were planting trees, 
then they would chose to plant trees and vice versa (Chen et al. 2009).  
In a systematic review of taboos held by traditional societies, Colding and Folke 
(2001) identified six categories of taboos (which they refer to as resource and habitat 
taboos) which influence conservation. Taboos which may have developed for reasons 
unconnected to natural resource management may play an important role in 
conservation (Colding and Folke 1997). For example, taboos have had a role in 
protecting a number of threatened species in Madagascar including lemurs of the 
Indiridae family, thought to embody dead ancestors, and the carnivorous fosa 
(Cryptoprocta ferox), believed to scavenge from the bodies of dead ancestors buried 
in the forest (Jones et al. 2008a). In both of these cases the taboos have their origin 
in respect for the ancestors, rather than in attempts to manage natural resources, 
however they play an important conservation role. Sacred groves are another 
example where conservation is a happy consequence of taboo, and not the result of 
an innate desire to conserve biodiversity (Gadgil and Vartak 1976). Initially protected 
for religious or cultural purposes, sacred groves are now increasingly important to 
biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services including pollination and seed 
dispersal (Bodin et al. 2006). Of course other taboos can have a negative 
conservation impact; for example spotted eagle owls (Bubo africanus) (Kideghesho 
2008) and the aye-aye (Daubentonia madagascariensis) (Simons and Meyers 2001) 
are associated with negative beliefs in parts of Tanzania and Madagascar respectively 
which can result in their persecution.  
Conservation interventions (for example the establishment of a protected area with 
associated rules) may erode social norms or taboos and the institutions that enforce 
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them (Anoliefo et al. 2003; Jones et al. 2008a). For example, Jones et al. (2008a) 
found that the designation of Ranomafana National Park in Madagascar had resulted 
in the breakdown of traditional management of pandans (Pandanus spp.), a plant 
used for weaving. Since the resource became the property of the park, the social 
norm which had prevailed (to be careful not to damage the growing tip when 
harvesting) became widely disregarded. Newly introduced religions and the drive to 
modernisation have also contributed to the erosion of locally held social norms which 
traditionally protected sacred groves and streams in Nigeria and Tanzania (Anoliefo 
et al. 2003; Kideghesho 2008). Where there is limited capacity for enforcement 
conservationists must take great care when introducing new rules which may 
inadvertently result in the breakdown of social norms which provide some positive 
management (Gelcich et al. 2006; Jones et al. 2008a).  
Perceived behavioural control 
We do not know of any studies in conservation which have quantified the influence of 
the presence or absence of facilitating factors on decision making in the way that 
perceived behavioural control does in the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1991). 
When social psychologists measure perceived behaviour control they are quantifying 
to what extent people feel that they have the ability to perform the behaviour being 
investigated. It measures the perceived presence (or absence) of required skills, 
resources and other prerequisites required, and how much power people perceive 
each of these factors to have in making the behaviour easy or hard to do (Ajzen 
1991). Such factors are important in decision making because people who believe 
that they have all the necessary resources, and perceive that the opportunity to 
perform the behaviour exists (with limited obstacles) are ultimately more likely to 
engage in the behaviour (Conner and Sparks 2008). Although this terminology has 
not been used in the conservation literature, studies have looked at factors (e.g. 
available resources and skill) that influence the success of enterprise interventions 
such as producing essential oils from wild plants or setting up ecotourism ventures 
(Salafsky et al. 2001), and factors such as product suitability that can influence 
uptake of project interventions such as installing a fuel efficient stove (Wallmo and 
Jacobson 1998). 
2.4 Discussion 
In the field of conservation and natural resource management we are generally good 
at getting the biology right; identifying new and threatened species and modelling 
the limits of ecosystems (Mascia et al. 2003). However, slowing biodiversity loss 
requires that we understand and influence the decision making processes which 
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result in behaviours which drive the loss. There has been some excellent work using 
simple economic models to investigate decisions which impact upon conservation 
success; for example the decision made by a poacher to engage in poaching, involves 
weighing up of costs (risk of detection and likely sanctions) and benefits (potential 
profit) (Mesterton-Gibbons and Milner-Gulland 1998). But there are other influences 
that we know much less about which are important in decision making. Some work 
has been done on attitudes towards conservation, and there is a considerable wealth 
of knowledge concerning social norms that govern natural resource extraction. Yet 
only a few studies have investigated predictors of behaviour in a coherent holistic 
way. In particular, rarely has human behaviour that impacts upon the success of 
conservation interventions been studied using existing social psychological models. 
These models have been tried and tested in other areas including health, illicit drug 
abuse, and tax compliance. They have made a significant contribution to 
understanding the beliefs that underlie peoples’ decisions to engage in specific 
behaviours and this information has been used to design interventions that have 
been successful in influencing behaviour. 
There have been a number of studies in conservation in recent years which 
considered attitudes towards conservation. However, they have been of limited use in 
designing conservation interventions aimed at changing behaviour, largely because of 
the mismatch between the attitude studied, and the behaviour of interest. The trend 
has been to investigate general attitudes towards conservation, rather than attitudes 
towards specific, clearly defined behaviours which conservationists are interested in 
promoting or reducing. Some studies have noted that positive conservation attitudes 
do not translate to pro-conservation behaviours (Infield and Namara 2001; Waylen et 
al. 2009). This is supported by the social psychological literature, which emphasises 
that general attitudes do not successfully predict specific behaviours (Conner and 
Sparks 2008). By more specifically defining the behaviour of interest in terms of 
target, action, context and time scale; and collecting quantitative data not only on 
attitude, but also on subjective norms, the presence of facilitating factors, and moral 
obligation, the predictors of specific behaviours will be better understood.  
Biodiversity loss is in large part the result of human behaviours. Whilst these 
behaviours (for example over-exploitation, habitat conversion, introducing species 
and burning of fossil fuels which lead to climate change) continue to be the major 
drivers of loss – so influencing behaviour must form a major part of the conservation 
solution. As such, we must expand our knowledge and skills in understanding and 
influencing human behaviour. So we do not waste valuable time we should refrain 
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from re-inventing the wheel and ensure that we learn from the wealth of knowledge 
held by other disciplines. 
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3.1 Introduction 
There are many approaches to the conservation of biodiversity and management of 
natural resources, many of which depend, to varying extent, on rules that restrict 
human use (Gaveau et al. 2009; Keane et al. 2008). For example: protected areas 
prohibit certain activities within their boundaries (Jachmann 2008; Struhsaker et al. 
2005); many countries have legislation protecting certain species (Lee et al. 2005); 
and rules govern the harvesting of managed populations (Takahashi 2009). However, 
the existence of rules alone does not change behaviour (Rowcliffe et al. 2004) as 
demonstrated by ongoing illegal resource extraction (Berkes et al. 2006; Laurance et 
al. 2004). Understanding levels of rule breaking is important in developing 
interventions to improve compliance. Unfortunately, directly studying compliance and 
its determinants is difficult as rule breakers may be unwilling to reveal themselves or 
to discuss their motivations freely for fear of punishment (Gavin et al. 2010; Keane 
et al. 2008). Rule breaking can be considered a sensitive behaviour; where 
answering questions honestly may have implications for participants (Sieber and 
Stanley 1988). Disciplines such as psychology, criminology and health have 
developed methods that address the inherent difficulties of collecting data on 
sensitive topics. However, these have not been widely applied within the context of 
conservation and natural resource management where most studies aiming to 
quantify rule breaking by gathering data directly from the public (which includes 
potential rule breakers) have used questionnaires delivered through face-to-face 
interviews (Table 3.1). 
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Such interviews can be a cost effective method for obtaining robust information on 
legal and socially acceptable exploitation of wild species (Jones et al. 2008b). 
However, when such exploitation is illegal, or otherwise sensitive (goes against social 
norms for example) biases can reduce the validity of data (Fisher 1993; Warner 
1965). This problem has been raised by a number of authors studying illegal natural 
resource extraction from protected areas (Table 3.1). The two main biases which 
influence surveys of sensitive behaviour are social desirability bias and non-response 
bias (Fisher 1993; Warner 1965).  
Bias in sensitive surveys 
Social desirability bias is the systematic error caused by respondents providing 
dishonest answers in order to project a favourable image of themselves relative to 
prevailing social norms (Fisher 1993; King and Bruner 2000). Non-response bias 
results from a non-random and significant proportion of individuals refusing to take 
part in a survey, either wholly, or partly (Lahaut et al. 2002). Socio-demographic 
variables can be used to correct for non-response bias if it is acceptable to assume 
that respondents and non-respondents within the same category are equal with 
respect to the outcome variable, which is unlikely (Lahaut et al. 2002). 
Assurances of confidentiality tend to increase response rate and validity (including 
reduced social desirability bias) when the topics are sensitive (Singer et al. 1995). 
When using a self-complete questionnaire anonymity can be guaranteed by not 
requesting personally identifying information. However specialised methods exist that 
as well as guaranteeing anonymity, also minimise respondents’ feeling of  risk 
associated with revealing sensitive, and potentially incriminating information (Lee 
1993).  Examples of risk-reducing methods include the randomised response 
technique (RRT) (Warner 1965), and the nominative technique (Miller 1985; Sudman 
et al. 1977). Through different mechanisms both increase response rates and 
reliability in surveys containing sensitive questions (Lee 1993; Miller 1985; Warner 
1965). These methods also protect the researcher since no incriminating data can be 
directly linked to a respondent (Sudman et al. 1977; Warner 1965). 
The randomised response technique 
By using a randomising device (e.g. dice), RRT inserts an element of chance in the 
question-answer process which increases respondent privacy (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 
2005b; Warner 1965). There are a number of RRT designs described in the literature, 
the merits of which are discussed in depth by Lensvelt-Mulders et al. (2005a). 
‘Forced response’ RRT (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005a) is one of the most statistically 
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efficient RRT designs and is the one used in this study. Respondents are instructed 
(rather than forced, as the name suggests) to either: answer a sensitive question 
truthfully or to say YES or say NO (irrespective of the truth), depending on the 
number they roll on a die (Boruch 1971 in Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005a). For 
example respondents may be told: if the die lands on one, two, three or four please 
answer the question truthfully; if the die lands on five, simply answer YES; if the die 
lands on six, simply answer NO. The result of the die is never divulged to the 
interviewer. By knowing the probability of respondents answering the sensitive 
question, and the proportion of respondents instructed to say YES, the proportion of 
the population with the sensitive characteristic (the number of truthful YES 
responses) can be calculated without any individual identifying themselves (Lensvelt-
Mulders et al. 2005a; Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b; Warner 1965).  
RRT has been used across a range of sensitive behaviours including benefit fraud 
(Bockenholt and van der Heijden 2007), academic cheating (Scheers and Dayton 
1987), and illegal abortion (Silva and Vieira 2009). In comparative studies RRT has 
provided higher estimations of sensitive behaviours compared to anonymous self-
complete questionnaires (Donovan et al. 2003; Scheers and Dayton 1987), and face-
to-face questionnaires  (Silva and Vieira 2009) which has been taken as evidence of 
more honest reporting. In validation studies where true levels of the sensitive 
behaviour were known, RRT returned higher levels of correct responses than 
conventional methods (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b).  
The nominative technique 
The nominative technique asks respondents to report the number of close friends 
that they know with certainty have done the sensitive behaviour. By applying a 
correction (weighting) for duplication (multiple respondents may report the same 
person), the proportion of people in the population who have done the sensitive 
behaviour can be estimated (Miller 1985). A question set using the nominative 
technique was inserted in the 1977, 1979 and 1982 American National Surveys on 
Drug Abuse. Researchers found that the life time prevalence of heroin use estimated 
by the nominative technique was higher than corresponding anonymous self-
completed questionnaire data (Miller 1985). Advocates of the method suggest that it 
reduces social-desirability bias, non-response bias, sampling variance and that 
estimates gained through this technique are statistically stronger since information is 
gained about more respondents (Sudman and Bradburn 1982).  
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Despite the number of studies within conservation highlighting the limitations of 
conventional approaches to asking sensitive questions (Table 3.1), few studies have 
used specialised risk-reducing methods designed to overcome the inherent difficulties 
of such surveys. We found only five published studies using RRT (Blank and Gavin 
2009; Chaloupka 1985; Schill and Kline 1995; Solomon et al. 2007; Wright 1980), 
and we have not found any examples of the nominative technique in the natural 
resource management or conservation field.  Few studies formally compare methods 
for obtaining data on rule breaking (Gavin et al. 2010). In this study we investigate 
the potential and limitations of methods specifically designed for estimating sensitive 
behaviours such as rule breaking, compared with a conventional self-complete 
questionnaire using a case study of fly fishers in north Wales, UK. Although we did 
not have estimates of the true level of rule breaking, we expected that the 
specialised risk-reducing methods would produce higher estimates of rule breaking 
than the self-complete questionnaire and that this effect would be more marked for 
more sensitive questions.  
3.2 Methods 
Case study: fly fishing in north Wales, UK  
In the UK fly fishing is a popular sport governed by a set of rules designed to sustain 
fish stocks whilst protecting waterways and their biodiversity. By law fly fishers in the 
UK are required to hold a valid Environment Agency (EA) rod license. The EA conduct 
enforcement patrols and failure to comply can result in the confiscation of equipment 
and a fine of up to £2,500.  National byelaws prohibit the killing of brown trout 
(Salmo trutta) outside of the season (22 March and 30 September in Wales), 
enforcement is the responsibility of the EA and offences are handled in accordance 
with the Salmon & Freshwater Fisheries Act 1975: Section 19 (4). Other rules are set 
by the fishery and failure to comply might result in a ban (see Table 3.2). Currently 
there are no data available to provide estimates of rule breaking for different fly 
fishing rules.  
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Table 3.2 Survey questions – compliance section 
Code  Question Sanction Sensitivity 
No rod licence In the last 12 months did you 
ever fly fish without an 
Environment Agency rod 
license? 
Confiscation of 
equipment and 
up to £2500 
fine. 
High 
No day permit In the last 12 months did you 
ever fly fish without a valid day 
permit? 
Potentially 
banned from 
fishery. 
Medium 
Used live bait In the last 12 months did you 
ever fly fish with live bait in a 
fly only water? 
Potentially 
banned from 
fishery. 
Medium 
Exceeded bag 
limit 
In the last 12 months did you 
ever exceed the bag limit? 
Potentially 
banned from 
fishery (but 
opportunity to 
pay for extra fish 
retrospectively). 
Medium 
Caught 
undersized fish 
In the last 12 months did you 
ever take undersized fish? 
Potentially 
banned from 
fishery. 
 
Unlikely to 
occur at 
research site. 
Killed brown 
trout 
In the last 12 months did you 
ever illegally take brown trout? 
Confiscation of 
equipment and 
fine at 
Magistrates 
discretion. 
Unlikely to 
occur at 
research site. 
 
Data collection 
Each of the three survey instruments (self-complete, RRT and nominative surveys) 
were initially piloted on colleagues and improved before a formal pilot with 20 fly 
fisher respondents. No further improvements were necessary so the pilot data from 
fly fishers (n = 20) were included in the final analysis. Surveys were administered to 
a total of 209 fishers at two privately managed fisheries on 19 days between May 
and July 2009 by FAVStJ The two fisheries are 20 miles (33 km) apart and are 
similarly priced, offering the same facilities and ease of access to fishing areas. The 
fisheries were selected because a personal contact introduced FAVStJ to the fisheries 
owners’ who approved the study; the owner was never present when interviews were 
conducted. Fishers encountered more than once were not re-interviewed.  
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Survey instruments were made up of two parts: a series of questions related to rule 
breaking and a simple demographic survey (age, gender, area of residence) including 
information on fishing behaviour (frequency and number of sites visited). 
Respondents were randomly allocated one of the three survey instruments (self-
complete questionnaire, RRT survey, and nominative questionnaire) by selecting a 
ball from a cloth bag. Question wording was identical for each of the three survey 
instruments. All questions referred to the last 12 months to minimise recall 
inaccuracy (Table 3.2). See Appendix 1 for survey protocol and a full copy of the 
survey.  
Self-complete survey 
Respondents were asked to circle YES or NO responses to the six compliance 
questions. Respondents were left alone to complete the survey and were given an 
envelope to seal the completed questionnaire in before placing it in a padlocked box.  
Randomised response technique survey 
The RRT survey followed a ‘forced response’ model whereby respondents were 
required to answer the sensitive compliance question truthfully if the die landed on 
one, two, three or four. Respondents were asked to simply say the word YES, without 
reading the question, if the die landed on five; and to say NO without reading the 
question if it landed on six. Because the interviewer does not know whether a 
respondent is saying YES because they have broken the rule or because the die 
landed on a five, the interviewer does not have any sensitive information from the 
respondent. The probabilities associated with each response are given in Figure 3.1.  
Respondents were given a non-transparent plastic beaker containing one die, one 
example question card, and six compliance question cards each of which displayed 
the randomising device instructions. All cards were identical in design, only the 
questions differed. Respondents first had the method explained to them using the 
example question. Two strategies were adopted to maximise respondents following 
the RRT instructions: the analogy of following the rules of a game was used; and 
respondents were encouraged not to read the question if they threw a five or six, but 
to directly say YES or NO respectively. Questions were short, so the time taken to 
read and respond was minimal; as such the interviewer was not able to distinguish 
forced responses from truthful responses by considering the amount of time that 
respondents took to answer each question. The proportion of rule-breakers in the 
sample was then estimated using the ‘forced response’ model (Boruch 1971 in 
Lensvelt-Mulders et al. (2005a): 
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where πA is the proportion of the sample who have broken the rule, λ is the 
proportion of all responses that are YES,  P1 is the probability of having to answer the 
sensitive question truthfully and πF is the probability of the response being YES, 
conditional on being forced.  
 
Figure 3.1 Decision tree for a ‘forced response’ randomised response survey using a 
single die.  
 
Nominative survey 
Each respondent was asked how many of their close friends fly fish. They were then 
asked if any of these nominated friends break fly fishing rules. If a respondent was 
aware that any nominated friend had broken a fly fishing rule in the last 12 months 
the interviewer proceeded to ask the compliance questions in respect of a nominated, 
but anonymous, close friend. If a respondent knew of more than one rule breaking 
close friend, they were asked to list the initials of each of them (never revealed to 
the researcher); one was then selected at random (see Miller (1985) for details). 
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Respondents were then asked how they were aware that their nominated friend had 
broken a fly fishing rule; and how many other people were aware of this friend’s non-
compliant behaviour. Following Miller (1985) this information was used to weight 
individual responses, eliminating the possibility of multiple-counting of rule breakers: 
∑
= +
=
n
j j
j
X B
A
T
1 1  
where Tx is the total number of rule breakers in a sample of size n, Aj is the number 
of rule breakers known to individual j and Bj is the number of individuals (other than 
j) that know of the nominated friend’s rule breaking.  
Data analysis 
Data were analysed using SPSS PC version 16.0 (SPSS Inc. Chicago USA). 
Demographic and fishing behaviour data were non-normal and were hence analysed 
with non-parametric tests for differences between sites and methods. Ninety-five 
percent confidence intervals of the proportion of rule breakers in each category were 
estimated from 1000 bootstrap samples for the self-complete, RRT and nominative 
data. Bootstrap sampling of the RRT data estimates uncertainty arising from the RRT 
method as well as sample uncertainty. We concluded that there was a significant 
difference between methods when the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for the 
mean difference did not include zero. 
3.3 Results 
Just six people refused to participate in the survey (non-response rate <3%). In all 
cases this was before the method had been selected. Of the 209 respondents 61 
answered the self-complete questionnaire, 90 completed the RRT survey, and 58 
completed the nominative questionnaire. The mean age of respondents was 54 (± 
1.1 Std Error, n = 203) and the majority of all respondents (95%, n = 199) were 
male. Respondents fished at the interview location a mean of 30.6 (± 2.4 Std Error, 
n = 179) times per year, and nearly half of all respondents (44%, n = 91) did not 
fish at any other fishery. There was no significant difference between groups 
randomly assigned to the different methods for age (Kruskal-Wallis test H = 2.43, p 
= 0.30, n = 203), number of other sites fished at (Kruskal-Wallis test H = 3.85, p = 
0.15, n = 205), frequency of fishing at the interview site (Kruskal-Wallis test H = 
0.66 p = 0.72, n = 179) or area of residence (local: reside within the same postcode 
area as the fishery; and non-local) (Kruskal-Wallis test H = 1.75, p = 0.416, n = 
208). Most (85%, n = 178) surveys were completed at site one. Respondents 
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interviewed at the two sites did not differ significantly with respect to number of 
other sites visited (Mann Whitney U test 2454.0, p = 0.40, n = 205) or the frequency 
of fishing at the interview location (Mann Whitney U test 1737.5, p = 0.60, n = 179).  
The proportion of fishers who break each of the six fly fishing rules estimated using 
the three methods is shown in Figure 3.2. RRT estimated a significantly higher 
proportion of fishers failing to comply with the legal requirement to possess a rod 
license (mean difference between RRT and self-complete 0.25), and buy a valid 
permit (mean difference between RRT and self-complete 0.15). RRT estimated a 
higher proportion of fishers disregarding bait restrictions than the self-complete 
questionnaire (mean difference between RRT and self-complete 0.12); these two 
methods estimated similar proportions of fishers exceeding the bag limit (mean 
difference 0.02), these results were not significant. The nominative technique 
produced estimates close to zero for each of the six rules. Estimates of the proportion 
of the population catching undersized fish and unlawfully killing brown trout were 
close to zero for all methods. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 The proportion of fishers which break each of the six rules, estimated 
using the three methods. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Negative error 
bars occur for RRT where by chance the die forced fewer positive responses than 
expected; a larger sample size would reduce this problem. *RRT results are 
significantly different compared to the self-complete questionnaire.  
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3.4 Discussion 
Whilst killing brown trout outside of the fishing season and catching undersized fish 
are against the rules and therefore potentially sensitive behaviours, it became 
evident whilst collecting the data that the opportunity to break these rules did not 
exist at the research sites. Ponds are manually stocked with fish that meet the 
required size limit, and brown trout are limited in number and reportedly difficult to 
catch (when asked this question most fishers responded with a laugh, stating that 
they had never caught one). This explains why estimates of these behaviours were 
close to zero for all methods. For the other four questions, we found large 
discrepancies between estimates of rule breaking using the three methods. Each 
method guaranteed anonymity in that no personal information was taken. However, 
two of the methods (RRT and the nominative technique) were risk-reducing methods 
specially designed to reduce the level of threat perceived by respondents when asked 
to reveal sensitive, or potentially incriminating information (Lee 1993). RRT tended 
to result in higher estimates of rule breaking than the self-complete questionnaire. 
This effect was particularly marked for the most sensitive question (fishing without a 
valid rod license), but was also seen for two of the three questions of medium 
sensitivity (no day permit; used live bait). Higher levels of reporting of sensitive 
behaviours have been taken as evidence of more honest reporting in other studies 
(Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b; Scheers and Dayton 1987; Silva and Vieira 2009; 
Solomon et al. 2007). So we suggest that RRT did appear to be successful in eliciting 
more honest responses. RRT and the self-complete questionnaire produced very 
similar estimates for the question on exceeding the bag limit. By admitting to 
breaking this rule, fishers get the opportunity to boast about their fishing ability 
which may lessen the perceived sensitivity of the question. In addition, if the bag 
limit is exceeded, extra fish can be paid for, so breaking this rule is unlikely to result 
in a ban. RRT results suggest that more than one quarter (27%) of fishers have 
abused the legal requirement to hold a valid rod license in the last 12 months alone. 
This represents a considerable financial loss to the Environment Agency. Increasing 
spot checks may improve compliance but the Environment Agency should be wary of 
the heavy handed bailiff approach which received negative remarks from fishers. RRT 
results also suggest the fishery owners are losing considerable income due to fishers 
failing to purchase a day permit and that many fishers abuse bait restrictions. 
Whether this loss would justify increased investment in enforcement would need 
further research. 
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The nominative technique resulted in estimates of rule breaking close to zero for all 
six rules. These nominative data are lower even than the level of rule breaking that 
respondents admitted to via a commonly used method, the self-complete 
questionnaire. This method depends on respondents being familiar with their friends’ 
behaviour (Miller 1985; Sudman et al. 1977). Perhaps fishers are not adequately 
informed about the behaviour of their fly fisher friends to provide valid information of 
their rule breaking. Alternatively, if they are aware of their friends’ rule breaking 
behaviour, they were not prepared to discuss it in a face-to-face interview. This is not 
in keeping with the findings of Miller (1985) who reported respondents giving up 
information about their heroine user friends. This method has never been used in a 
conservation context. It may offer potential in some circumstances but prior to its 
use, careful consideration will be needed on the likelihood that respondents will have 
the required level of knowledge about friends’ behaviour and the likelihood that 
people will be willing to disclose such information before deciding to use this method.  
Illegal resource extraction has been quantified indirectly in many different ways: 
transects recording timber removal and snaring within forests (Olupot et al. 2009); 
satellite imagery of deforestation rates (Steininger et al. 2001); comparison of fish 
landing statistics with processing plant production (McCluskey and Lewison 2008); 
survey of snares and bushmeat markets (Noss 1998); and analysis of stock-piled 
ivory against seizures of illegally traded ivory (Sharp 1997). The merits and 
limitations of some methods of indirectly measuring illegal resource extraction have 
been discussed by Gavin et al. (2010). Whilst each of these methods provides an 
insight into the levels and impacts of illegal resource extraction, they tell us little 
about the characteristics of rule breakers. This has direct management implications 
with respect to designing interventions to improve compliance. In the absence of 
direct knowledge of rule breakers, managers have a limited ability to target 
interventions to change their behaviour, for example through awareness schemes or 
through targeted enforcement activities. With limited resources available to manage 
natural resources worldwide, ways to improve the efficiency of management 
interventions should be explored. To this end, improving the way in which we gather 
direct data on rule breaking can play an important role.  
There is considerable evidence that face-to-face interviews concerning illegal natural 
resource extraction provide inaccurate information due to respondents’ unwillingness 
to reveal sensitive information (Table 3.1). Studying rule breaking of fly fishers 
provided an opportunity to trial two different risk-reducing methods designed for 
researching sensitive topics: the nominative technique (previously only used to 
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investigate illegal drug use) and RRT. The nominative technique did not perform well. 
However, as with other comparative studies (Donovan et al. 2003; Scheers and 
Dayton 1987; Silva and Vieira 2009; Solomon et al. 2007), we found that RRT 
returned significantly higher estimates of non-compliance than the conventional 
questionnaire. This suggests that whilst anonymity may increase reporting, other 
mechanism can further increase the validity of sensitive data. RRT does have one 
principal disadvantage compared to conventional methods: the method adds random 
noise to the data (resultant of the forced YES and NO responses), therefore large 
samples are needed to obtain estimates with acceptable errors (Lensvelt-Mulders et 
al. 2005b). However if the topic under investigation is sensitive, this compromise in 
efficiency is compensated for by the apparent increase in data validity (Lensvelt-
Mulders et al. 2005a). Another potential disadvantage is that RRT may be difficult to 
explain to respondents. However we did not encounter problems during this study 
and Solomon et al. (2007) have provided evidence of the adaptability of RRT for use 
in illiterate communities in the developing world.  
Too much is now known about the limitations of directly asking people sensitive 
questions and expecting honest answers for conservationists to blindly use 
conventional face-to-face interviews to obtain estimates of rule breaking. We suggest 
that RRT may be a useful, but currently underused, tool for natural resource 
managers and conservationists. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The management of natural resources and conservation of threatened species often 
rests on the successful management of people's behaviour. For example reducing 
over fishing, preventing illegal bushmeat hunting, reducing grazing inside protected 
areas, and encouraging environmentally sensitive farming methods all depend on 
decisions made by individuals (Edwards-Jones 2006; Hilborn 2007; Infield and 
Namara 2001; Rowcliffe et al. 2004). Initiatives intended to encourage changes in 
behaviour (whether through enforcement of existing laws, creating positive 
incentives, or changing people’s attitudes) are most efficient when they target those 
most likely to be involved in the behaviours of concern. Unfortunately in conservation 
and natural resource management, many of the behaviours of concern are sensitive 
because they are illegal or socially taboo, meaning that those involved may not wish 
to reveal themselves for fear of punishment or social opprobrium (Gavin et al. 2010; 
Keane et al. 2008). As a result, identifying the key groups to target with 
interventions aimed at changing behaviour can be challenging and there is a need for 
indicators which can act as reliable proxies for involvement in these various activities. 
A number of studies have looked at people’s attitudes towards species, habitats or 
management interventions, assuming that attitudes are useful indicators of 
behaviour (Holmes 2003). However the evidence for attitude being a reliable and 
useful indicator of behaviour is mixed. For example, people involved in a long term 
community-conservation programme near Mburo National Park in Uganda, had more 
positive attitudes towards wildlife and the park than people who had not been part of 
the programme, but little difference in behaviour was observed and high levels of 
poaching and illegal grazing continued (Infield and Namara 2001). Many such studies 
have been criticised for failing to ensure that the attitudes investigated were 
consistent with the behaviours of interest (St. John et al. 2010b). As a result, there is 
little consensus about whether attitudes can be used as a reliable indicator of 
behaviour. 
A second potential indicator of sensitive behaviour arises from a psychological bias 
known as the false consensus effect (Petroczi et al. 2008). The term ‘false consensus’ 
describes the tendency people have to imagine that others are more like themselves 
than they really are, causing survey respondents to systematically bias their 
estimates of population-level prevalence of an activity in accordance with their own 
behaviour (Ross et al. 1977). For example, people who smoke cigarettes have been 
found to estimate a higher proportion of smokers in the population, compared with 
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non-smokers (Sherman et al. 1983). To date, the potential application of the false 
consensus effect to natural resource management has not been explored. 
Other potential indicators of sensitive behaviours include a person’s knowledge of 
rules. This may include laws enforced by formal institutions, and the perceived 
sensitivity of actions according to prevailing social norms enforced by informal 
institutions (North 1994). Whilst enforced and punished through different 
mechanisms, both types of rules aim to deter socially unacceptable behaviours and 
can attract considerable penalties (Becker 1968; Posner and Rasmusen 1999). The 
utility of knowledge of formal rules and the perceived sensitivity of behaviours as 
indicators of sensitive behaviour have not been investigated in conservation and 
natural resource management. 
In order to properly test the effectiveness of any such indicator, it is necessary to be 
able to link them to an accurate estimate of sensitive behaviour. Recently, innovative 
survey methods such as the randomised response technique (RRT) (Warner 1965) 
have been used to make improved estimates of the prevalence of illegal natural 
resource use (Solomon et al. 2007; St. John et al. 2010a). When the topic of 
investigation is sensitive, guaranteeing anonymity increases response rate and data 
validity (Singer et al. 1995); however, RRT provides respondents with an additional 
assurance of privacy beyond that achieved by ensuring respondent anonymity. This is 
achieved by using a randomising device (such as dice) to add an element of chance 
to the question answer process (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b; Warner 1965). For 
example respondents may be instructed to role a die (in privacy) and: if it lands on 
one, two, three, or four to answer the question truthfully, with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’; if the 
die lands on five to answer ‘yes’; and if it lands on six to answer ‘no’, irrespective of 
the truth (St. John et al. 2010a). Because respondents never reveal the result of the 
die to the interviewer, the interviewer is unaware of which responses are truthful and 
which are forced by the die, ensuring that sensitive behaviours cannot be linked to 
individual respondents. RRT has been shown to increase the validity of data on 
sensitive topics (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005a; Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b) in a 
variety of contexts (e.g., illegal abortion, (Silva and Vieira 2009); and health 
insurance fraud, (Bockenholt and van der Heijden 2007)) with the extent of gains in 
data validity increasing with topic sensitivity (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b). Despite 
their promise, previous applications of RRT to resource management problems have 
been limited to assessing population-level prevalence of behaviours and have not 
linked characteristics of individuals or groups to behaviours of interest.  
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Human-wildlife conflict is a prominent example of a sensitive issue which is difficult 
to study directly. Habitat loss and competition for resources in many parts of the 
world have led many people living in proximity to wildlife to feel that their lives or 
economic security are at risk (Treves and Karanth 2003). The problems are 
particularly acute with respect to carnivores which, due to their large home ranges 
and dietary requirements, are pre-disposed to conflict with humans (Inskip and 
Zimmermann 2009). Many countries have legislation that legally protects carnivores 
such as wolves (Canis lupis) in the United States of America and India (Agarwala et 
al. 2010), but killings continue, making protected carnivore persecution an issue of 
global conservation concern (Treves and Karanth 2003; Woodroffe et al. 2007). 
Illegal carnivore persecution has been measured indirectly in different ways 
(Hedmark and Ellegren 2005; Linkie et al. 2003), but such indirect methods tell us 
little about the characteristics of the people persecuting carnivores making it difficult 
to target interventions aimed at reducing carnivore killing.  
In this study we first use RRT to estimate the proportion of South African farmers in 
the north-eastern provinces killing five carnivore species and performing two illegal 
behaviours: failing to hold a valid permit to kill a protected carnivore; and using 
poison to kill carnivores. Secondly we use logistic regression (van den Hout et al. 
2007) to investigate individual indicators of carnivore killing focusing on farmers’: 
attitude towards the existence of carnivores on ranches; estimates of their peers’ 
carnivore killing behaviour; perceived sensitivity of RRT questions; and beliefs about 
the existence of sanctions. This approach (van den Hout et al. 2007), novel to 
conservation and natural resource management, allows us to investigate the 
usefulness of non-sensitive indicators of sensitive behaviours. 
4.2 Methods 
Case study: carnivore persecution by farmers in north eastern 
South Africa 
South African cattle and game farmers have commercial interest in protecting their 
stock from carnivores and in this context some carnivores are killed because they are 
thought to have predated stock (Lindsey et al. 2005). The South African Biodiversity 
Act of 2004 aims to protect certain species including the near threatened (IUCN 
2010) brown hyaena (Parahyaena brunnea) and leopard (Panthera pardus) but a 
permit can be obtained to control species covered by this Act (e.g. by shooting or 
poisoning) if they are causing damage to stock or pose a threat to human life 
(Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2007). Failure to comply with the 
Act can attract a fine of up to R100, 000 (~ $15,000) or three times the commercial 
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value of the specimen concerned, up to five years in prison, or a combination of fine 
and imprisonment. Other carnivores, such as snakes (except for the Gaboon adder 
(Bitis gabonica) and African rock python (Python natalensis)), black-backed jackal 
(Canis mesomelas) and caracal (Caracal caracal) are not protected under the Act but 
they are included in this study to introduce variability into the sensitivity of 
behaviours under investigation. All five species are widely distributed across the 
study area (Friedmann et al. 2002) and are known to be killed on ranches as part of 
pest control activities (Thorn 2009).  
Data collection 
The survey (Appendix 2) was piloted on colleagues and improved before a formal 
pilot of 16 farmers from cattle, game and mixed stock farms at game auctions in 
north-eastern provinces of South Africa. No further improvements were necessary so 
the pilot data from farmers (n = 16) were included in the final analysis. Surveys were 
administered to a total of 99 farmers at cattle and game auctions in north-eastern 
provinces between May and September 2010 by FAVStJ and Lauren Jones. The 
survey was made up of seven short sections: RRT questions; perceived sensitivity of 
RRT questions; farmers’ estimates of the proportion of peers killing carnivores; basic 
demographics; beliefs about the existence of sanctions; and two attitude statement 
sections. RRT questions referred to the last 12 months to minimise recall inaccuracy 
whilst also allowing an adequate time for the behaviour to have occurred (Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1 Randomised response technique questions and information about the 
sanctions for killing each of the carnivores included in the study 
Code Question Sanction 
Snake In the last 12 months did you kill any 
snakes? 
None 
Jackal In the last 12 months did you kill any 
jackals? 
None 
Brown 
hyaena 
In the last 12 months did you kill any 
brown hyaenas? 
Fine and / or prisona in 
the absence of required 
permit. 
Caracal In the last 12 months did you kill any 
caracals? 
None 
Leopard In the last 12 months did you kill any 
leopards? 
Fine and / or prisona in 
the absence of required 
permit. 
Poison In the last 12 months did you use poison to 
control predators? 
Fine and / or prisonb 
 
Permit In the last 12 months did you kill any 
predators without the required permit from 
the Local Wildlife Authority 
Fine and / or prisona. 
a Regulation 73 of the South Africa Biodiversity Act 2004 states that: a person is 
guilty of an offence if they undertake a restricted activity involving a threatened or 
protected species without a permit. A person convicted of an offence in terms of 
regulation 73 is liable to (a) a fine of R100,000, or three times the commercial value 
of the specimen; and / or (b) to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years; 
or (c) to both a fine and such imprisonment. 
b Regulation No. R181 published in Government Gazette No. 24329, of the Fertilizers, 
Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act, 1947 (Act No. 36 of 
1947) prohibits the use of an agricultural remedy or stock remedy except as 
indicated on the label. Any persons failing to comply are liable on conviction to an 
unspecified fine or imprisonment not exceeding two years or to both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
 
Randomised response technique 
A number of RRT designs are described in the literature, we use one of the more 
statistically efficient designs: the ‘forced response’ RRT (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 
2005a). Depending upon the dice number they roll, respondents are instructed (not 
forced as the name suggests) to either: answer a sensitive question truthfully, ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’; or to give a prescribed response irrespective of the truth (Boruch 1971 in 
(Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b)). The result of the dice throw is never revealed to the 
interviewer, so respondents’ privacy is fully protected, but by knowing the probability 
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of respondents being required to answer the sensitive question, and the probability 
that they were instructed to say ‘yes’ irrespective of the truth, the aggregate level of 
the sensitive behaviour can be calculated (Hox and Lensvelt-Mulders 2004; St. John 
et al. 2010a). 
Respondents were required to answer the sensitive question truthfully if the sum of 
the two dice was five through to ten (probability = 3/4). Respondents were simply 
asked to give a fixed answer 'yes', if the sum of the two dice was two, three or four 
(probability = 1/6); and to give a fixed answer 'no' if the sum of the two dice was 11 
or 12 (probability = 1/12). The interviewer does not know if the respondent is saying 
‘yes’ because they have undertaken the behaviour, or because the dice summed 
three or four, (the result of the dice roll is never revealed to the interviewer) so the 
interviewer does not hold any sensitive information about the respondent. 
Respondents were given an opaque beaker containing two dice, one example 
question card, and seven question cards each of which displayed the randomising 
device instructions. All cards were identical in design, only the questions differed. 
Respondents first had the method explained to them using the example question. To 
encourage respondents to follow the RRT instructions the analogy of following the 
rules of a game was used, and when the dice summed two, three, four, 11 or 12 
respondents were encouraged not to read the question but to give their ‘forced’ 
response of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ directly. For this section only the interviewer recorded 
answers on behalf of the respondent because they needed both hands to hold the 
RRT cards and shake dice; all other sections were self-completed by respondents.  
Beliefs on the existence of sanctions 
To investigate the relationship between reported behaviour (RRT response) and fear 
of sanctions, respondents were required to indicate the level of penalty they thought 
applied for killing each species; no penalty, or a penalty of up to Rs.100, 000 and up 
to five years imprisonment.  
Perceived RRT question sensitivity 
To understand the perceived sensitivity of each behaviour included in the RRT 
questions respondents were asked to indicate on a four point Likert scale (Nilsen et 
al. 2007) (+2 = very uneasy, through to -2 = not at all uneasy. There was no zero in 
this scale) how they thought most farmers would feel if they were asked to give a 
direct response to each of the RRT questions.  
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Attitude statements 
To ensure that the attitudes investigated were consistent with the behaviours of 
interest attitude statements were structured to be target, action, context, and time 
specific (Conner and Sparks 2008). Using a five point Likert scale respondents were 
asked to indicate their level of agreement with two attitude statements; we used two 
variants of an ‘attitude towards killing’ statement as a check on farmers’ response 
consistency. Attitude towards killing statement (a): ‘These days (time) I think that 
jackals (target) should be killed (action) on ranches (context)’; and statement (b): 
‘These days I think that killing jackals on ranches is wrong’. Both attitudes 
statements were completed for each of the five carnivores (ten statements in total). 
The statements were reverse scored, agreement with ‘should be killed on ranches’ 
scored -2 [strongly agree] to +2 [strongly disagree], whilst agreement with ‘killing is 
wrong’ scored +2 [strongly agree] to -2 [strongly disagree]; meaning that lower 
scores corresponded to attitudes that are less favourable to conserving carnivores. 
Farmers’ estimates of their peers’ behaviour  
To investigate the relationship of farmers’ estimates of the proportion of peers killing 
carnivores with farmers’ reported behaviour, respondents were asked to state how 
many farmers out of ten (range: zero to ten) in the province, they thought had 
undertaken each of the seven behaviours presented in the RRT questions in the last 
12 months. Following the principles of the false consensus effect, higher estimates 
should indicate a person’s involvement in the sensitive behaviour (Petroczi et al. 
2008); however, farmers’ responses were re-coded in the subsequent analyses to be 
consistent with all other variables whereby low scores are indicative of involvement 
in the sensitive behaviour. 
Data analysis 
Data were analysed using R version 12.2.0. The proportions of farmers killing each 
species, using poison, or failing to hold a valid permit (RRT responses) were 
estimated using the model of Hox and Lensvelt-Mulders (Hox and Lensvelt-Mulders 
2004): 
      
 
where π is the estimated proportion of the sample who have undertaken the 
behaviour, λ is the proportion of all responses in the sample that are ‘yes’, θ is the 
probability of the answer being a ‘forced yes’, s is the probability of having to answer 
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the sensitive question truthfully. Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals for RRT 
data were estimated from 10,000 bootstrap samples. These confidence intervals 
therefore incorporate both, uncertainty arising from the RRT method, and sample 
uncertainty. 
To examine the relationship between respondents' reported behaviour concerning 
each carnivore (their RRT responses) and their attitudes and perceptions, we fitted a 
generalised linear mixed model (GLMM) with a binary response and binomial error 
distribution. The grouping structure of the data, whereby each respondent answered 
questions about several species, was reflected in the model by including individual 
respondent IDs as a random effect. In this situation, GLMMs are able to make more 
efficient use of the data than a series of single species GLMs would allow (Gelman 
and Hill 2007). Species, attitude towards killing the species, attitude towards 
conserving the species, perceived question sensitivity, beliefs about the existence of 
sanctions, and estimated prevalence of persecutors were all considered as potential 
fixed effects within the model.  
Prior to modelling, we rescaled the predictor variables so that they were centred on 
zero and had the same range (from -2 to +2; (Gelman and Hill 2007)). The two 
forms of attitude data were checked for internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient (Nilsen et al. 2007; Santos 1999), and correlation coefficients were 
calculated for each pair of variables using Spearman’s correlation. Strongly correlated 
predictor variables were removed to avoid problems of multicollinearity.  
Models with binary responses typically employ a logistic link function. However, 
simple logistic regression is not appropriate for RRT data because the forced 
responses introduce bias and additional variability into the data. We therefore wrote 
a customised link function which incorporated the known probabilities of the forced 
RRT responses (van den Hout et al. 2007). The resultant model was: 
log     	   
   	  		   
 
where αj is the common intercept term for responses given by individual j, βN is the 
coefficient for the Nth covariate and xN is the vector of values for the Nth covariate. 
This link function behaves similarly to the logit link in logistic regression, constraining 
the response to lie between lower and upper bounds. With forced responses the 
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response is bounded at θ and θ + s, but if the probability of forced responses is zero, 
θ = 0, θ + s = 1 and the link function simplifies to the standard logit link.  
The model was fitted by penalised quasi-likelihood (PQL) using the glmmPQL function 
from the MASS package, which readily accepts user-defined link functions (Venables 
and Ripley 2002). PQL is a flexible approach which allows approximate inference in 
GLMMs (Breslow and Clayton 1993), and has been widely applied (Bolker et al. 
2009). However, the use of quasi-likelihood precludes standard likelihood-based 
approaches to model selection, such as Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and 
likelihood ratio tests, and in some circumstances it is known to produce biased 
estimates (Breslow 2003). To circumvent these limitations, while still benefiting from 
the power of the GLMM approach, we adopted an ad hoc model selection procedure 
(see Appendix 3, Section 1 for a discussion of this approach). First, we fitted a series 
of generalised linear models (GLM) for all possible combinations of predictors for 
each carnivore separately. The fit of these models was assessed using AIC (Burnham 
and Anderson 2002) (see Appendix 3, Table 1), and the structures of the best-fitting 
models were used as a basis for choosing the fixed effects structure for a GLMM 
incorporating all species. Finally, the parameter estimates from the GLMM were 
compared with those derived from the separate species' GLMs as a simple check to 
rule out the presence of large biases (see Appendix 3 Figure 1). 
To explore the relative strength of each of the indicators (attitude, sensitivity and 
farmers’ estimates of their peers’ behaviour) scenarios were generated from the 
fitted models. Scenario 1, developed to represent farmers more likely to admit to 
killing carnivores, had the focal indicator (either: attitude, sensitivity, or farmers’ 
estimates of their peers’ behaviour) set at its minimum value while other indicators 
were set at their average values. Scenario 2, developed to represent farmers less 
likely to admit to killing carnivores, had the focal indicator set at its maximum value 
while other indicators were set at their average values.  
4.3 Results 
For all questions where responses were recorded on a Likert scale, Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient was above 0.7 showing high internal consistency (Santos 1999). 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.868 (n = 95) for perceived RRT question sensitivity; 0.795 (n 
= 98) for the attitude statements in support of killing each species; and 0.882 (n = 
97) for attitude statements suggesting killing each species is wrong. 
Chapter 4. Identifying indicators of illegal behaviour 
51 
 
Ninety-nine farmers completed the survey. The majority of farmers interviewed 
(90.9%, n = 90) were male, the mean age was 49 years (Std. Error = 1.0, n = 98). 
Over half of the farmers (55%, n = 54) stocked game, or game mixed with cattle or 
other livestock, whilst the remainder (45%, n = 45) stocked cattle or mixed 
livestock. Most farmers were aware that there was no penalty for killing most snakes 
(87%, n = 83), jackal (85%, n = 82) and caracal (59%, n = 57), and most were 
aware that there was a penalty for killing brown hyaena (60%, n = 56) and leopard 
(88%, n = 84).  
Estimated proportion of farmers killing carnivores and breaking 
rules  
The estimated proportion of farmers that killed each of the species in the last 12 
months are shown in Figure 4.1. RRT estimated that a higher proportion of farmers 
killed non-protected species than protected species. The majority of respondents had 
killed snakes, and more than 45% had killed the common and widespread jackal, 
while 22% had killed caracal (the other non-protected species included in the study). 
Nineteen percent of farmers had killed leopards on their ranches in the last 12 
months while only 6% of respondents had killed brown hyaena in the same period 
(although as confidence intervals overlap zero it is possible that no farmers had killed 
brown hyaena). The proportions of farmers that used poison to kill carnivores, and 
killed protected carnivores without a valid permit were similar (21% and 22% 
respectively). 
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Figure 4.1 RRT estimates of the proportion of farmers that killed each of the five 
carnivore species or broke permit and poison-use rules in the 12 months preceding 
the study. Negative estimates can occur for RRT due to the stochastic variability of 
the forced responses. The bold line represents the median; the lower and upper 
edges of the box are the first and third quartiles; and the whiskers the maximum and 
minimum points. *Denote species protected under the Biodiversity Act of 2004.  
 
Indicators of carnivore killing 
Owing to the low prevalence of farmers killing brown hyaena we did not carry out 
modelling for this species. Preliminary examination of the data showed the two 
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attitude statements to be correlated (Spearman’s rank coefficient rs = 0.60, p = 
<0.001), so to avoid issues of multicollinearity, the variable representing the attitude 
that ‘killing is wrong’ was excluded from further analysis; respondents' beliefs about 
the existence of sanctions correlated with their estimates of peer-behaviour 
(Spearman’s rank coefficient rs = 0.47, p = <0.001) and was also discarded. 
Visualisation of the remaining predictors suggested that their effects were 
approximately linear, so for parsimony we modelled them as continuous rather than 
categorical variables. 
The likelihood of admitting to killing any given species was negatively and 
significantly related to farmers’ attitude towards killing species on their ranches (t = -
3.326, df = 247, p = 0.001), and question sensitivity (t = -2.063, df = 247, p = 
0.04). Farmers estimates of their peers’ behaviour was also negatively, but not 
significantly related (-t = 1.478, df = 247, p = 0.140) to the likelihood of admitting 
to killing any given species.  
Scenarios simulated from the fitted model illustrate the relative strength of each 
indicator (attitude, question sensitivity, and farmers’ estimates of peer-behaviour) at 
distinguishing differences in whether farmers kill carnivores (Figure 4.2a-c). For 
example Figure 4.2a illustrates that farmers reporting the attitude that carnivores 
should be killed on their ranches (Scenario 1) were more likely to have reported 
killing any given species, compared to farmers reporting that carnivores should not 
be killed on ranches (Scenario 2). Similarly, farmers estimating that a high 
proportion of their peers kill carnivores (Figure 4.2c; Scenario 1) were more likely to 
have reported killing any given species, compared to farmers reporting low estimates 
of the proportion of their peers killing carnivores (Scenario 2). Results suggest that 
attitude is the most useful indicator for distinguishing between groups of farmers who 
are more, or less likely to have killed carnivores; question sensitivity appears only 
slightly less useful, however in the discussion we explore our concerns about the 
causes underlying this effect. Although those who believe that many of their peers 
have killed carnivores are more likely to have killed carnivores themselves, this 
indicator provides less information for distinguishing carnivore killers from non-
killers. Figure 4.2d illustrates the maximum difference in the behaviour of farmers 
holding attitudes and perceptions at the two extremes: for example, we predict that 
farmers who estimated that all their peers kill leopards, reported the attitude that 
leopards should be killed on ranches, and who thought that the RRT question about 
killing leopards was not at all sensitive (Scenario 1) would have been 69.8% more 
Chapter 4. Identifying indicators of illegal behaviour 
54 
 
likely to have admitted to killing leopards, compared to farmers reporting the polar 
opposite in responses (Scenario 2). 
 
Figure 4.2 Simulations from the fitted model illustrating the relative strength of the 
three variables, separately (panels a-c) and in combination (panel d), as indicators of 
the aggregate level of carnivore killing. In panels a-c the focal indicator is set at its 
minimum (Scenario 1) or maximum (Scenario 2) value, while the other indicators are 
set to their average values. In panel d, the all three indicators are set at values 
which indicate the highest (Scenario 1) or lowest (Scenario 2) levels of persecution. 
Scenario 1 in panel d represents farmers who hold the attitude that the species 
should be killed on ranches; think the RRT questions are not sensitive; and estimate 
that a high proportion of peers kill carnivores; Scenario 2 shows the opposite. The 
bold line represents the median; the lower and upper edges of the box are the first 
and third quartiles; and the whiskers the maximum and minimum points. 
 
Chapter 4. Identifying indicators of illegal behaviour 
55 
 
4.4 Discussion 
Human behaviours such as illegal hunting (Hilborn et al. 2006), fishing (Mann 1995), 
wildlife trade (Shepherd and Nijman 2008), or killing due to human-wildlife conflict 
(Redpath et al. 2004) can be important threats to biodiversity, making understanding 
and influencing such behaviours an essential part of the solution (St. John et al. 
2010b). Many studies have reported that carnivores are killed as a result of conflict 
with human activities, particularly livestock production where farmers may kill 
carnivores to minimise actual or perceived losses from depredation (Bagchi and 
Mishra 2006; Mishra and Fitzherbert 2004; Oli et al. 1994; Zimmermann et al. 
2005). Such conflicts are particularly controversial when the carnivores concerned 
are of conservation concern and / or are legally protected (Graham et al. 2005). 
Studies investigating such behaviour have used conventional face-to-face surveys to 
investigate the prevalence of these activities and the attitudes of people towards 
carnivores, but some have noted conflicting findings (Mishra and Fitzherbert 2004), 
and suspected underreporting (Oli et al. 1994) because of the sensitive nature of the 
questions.   
In South Africa, where many farmers share land with large carnivores, human-
carnivore conflict is of particular conservation concern for the leopard and brown 
hyaena, (Thorn 2009) both considered near-threatened (IUCN 2010). However, there 
have been few attempts to estimate the prevalence of killing of these, or other, 
carnivores. Our estimate that 19% of farmers had killed leopards on their ranches in 
the last twelve months is worrying given the species’ low reproductive rate, cub and 
sub-adult survival (Nowell and Jackson 1996). We found that a similar percentage of 
farmers reported killing carnivores without the required permit as had killed leopards, 
suggesting that farmers rarely hold valid permits when killing protected carnivores. 
Further, many disregard restrictions which apply to the use of poisons (misused 
agricultural or stock remedies) for controlling carnivores, suggesting that 
communication and / or enforcement of wildlife laws is inadequate. We found a very 
small proportion of farmers (possibly none) killed brown hyaena in the last 12 
months. Leopards, whilst less abundant in the study area than brown hyaenas (Thorn 
2009), are generalist predators (Nowell and Jackson 1996) whilst brown hyaenas are 
primarily solitary nocturnal scavengers that supplement their diet with wild fruit, 
insects and bird eggs (Mills and Hofer 1998). These ecological differences may partly 
explain the difference in levels of persecution and possibly current densities. Our 
study confirms suggestions by others that jackals, and to a lesser extent caracals, 
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are commonly killed within farming areas of South Africa, but remain relatively 
abundant (Nowell and Jackson 1996; Sillero-Zubiri et al. 2004).  
By adapting the logistic regression model to incorporate the known probabilities of 
forced RRT responses, we were able to investigate individual predictors of carnivore 
killing in a GLMM framework. In our model we found a negative relationship between 
question sensitivity and RRT response; farmers who reported an RRT question about 
a specific carnivore as being sensitive were less likely to admit to killing that 
carnivore. There are two possible explanations for this. Reports of perceived question 
sensitivity may have captured farmers’ beliefs about the sensitivity of the action with 
respect to prevailing social norms, so farmers who reported a question as sensitive 
were genuinely less likely to kill that carnivore. However, some farmers may not 
have been willing to admit to killing certain carnivores despite the protection offered 
by RRT. It is impossible to rule out under-reporting of sensitive behaviour even when 
using such specifically designed techniques (Landsheer et al. 1999; Lensvelt-Mulders 
and Boeije 2007). However evidence from validation studies where the true status of 
each individual is known, (e.g. through access to police records) suggest that RRT 
returned more accurate responses compared to conventional survey instruments 
(Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b); and, studies comparing survey methods found that 
RRT returned significantly higher estimates of sensitive or illegal behaviours 
compared to conventional surveys, which has been interpreted as evidence of more 
honest reporting (Donovan et al. 2003; Scheers and Dayton 1987; Silva and Vieira 
2009; Solomon et al. 2007; St. John et al. 2010a). We also used what is known as a 
symmetrical RRT design (prescribing fixed responses as both yes (when dice sum 
two, three, or four), and no (when dice sum 11 or 12), which has been shown to 
increase the extent to which respondent follow RRT instructions (Ostapczuk et al. 
2009). Compared to conventional methods RRT has one principle disadvantage. Due 
to the random noise (added by the forced responses) RRT requires large samples in 
order to get estimates with acceptable precision (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b).  
A number of studies have investigated people’s attitudes towards carnivores (Bagchi 
and Mishra 2006; Lindsey et al. 2005; Naughton-Treves et al. 2003; Nilsen et al. 
2007; Oli et al. 1994; Zimmermann et al. 2005) but none have formally investigated 
the relationship of these attitudes with peoples’ conservation-related behaviours, e.g. 
killing of protected species. A farmer's negative attitudes towards a carnivore as a 
result of stock loses, may be mitigated by offering compensation for losses (Agarwala 
et al. 2010), but if the negative attitudes never resulted in farmers persecuting 
protected carnivores then such interventions may be considered a poor conservation 
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investment, as such it is critical to understand in what instances attitudes relate to 
behaviour. Incorporating attitude as an indicator of behaviour into our GLMM allowed 
us to investigate directly whether farmers’ attitudes towards the existence of 
carnivores on their ranches reflect their reported behaviour. Results suggest that 
farmers who hold the attitude that carnivores are pests and should be killed on 
ranches are indeed more likely to have killed carnivores in the last 12 months (as 
estimated by RRT). A number of studies have not found a clear relationship between 
attitudes and behaviour in the context of conservation (Infield and Namara 2001; 
Waylen et al. 2009). However such studies tend to investigate general attitudes 
(such as a person’s attitude towards conservation) and then attempt to link this to a 
very specific behaviour (such as poaching a particular animal from within a protected 
area); an approach which has been heavily criticised recently (Conner and Sparks 
2008; St. John et al. 2010b). By clearly specifying the time-scale, target, action and 
context of the attitude (these days [time] I think that jackals [target] should be killed 
[action] on ranches [context]) we found that attitude can be a useful indicator of 
behaviour. 
The relationship between farmers’ estimates of the proportion of peers killing 
carnivores and their own behaviour (as reported through RRT) supports the existence 
of the false consensus effect (Ross et al. 1977), whereby people who engage in 
socially undesirable behaviours provide higher estimates of the prevalence of that 
behaviour in the population, than do people not engaging in the behaviour (Monin 
and Norton 2003). Our data supports the suggestion by Petroczi et al. (2008) that 
asking respondents to estimate the proportion of people in the population that they 
think perform sensitive behaviours, offers some potential in identifying groups of 
people who perform sensitive behaviours.  
Our findings demonstrate the potential value of simple non-sensitive indicators for 
targeting conservation interventions. However our finding that attitude, and the 
perceived sensitivity of killing carnivores, predict carnivore killing in our models, also 
supports other evidence that farmers’ decisions to kill carnivores on their land is not 
purely based purely on economic costs and benefits. For example, Lagendijk and 
Gusset (2008) found that some people living around the greater Kruger area in South 
Africa do not kill lions even when they suffer economic losses and no compensation is 
available, and suggest that this is because of ‘cultural tolerance’. In fact evidence 
suggests that cultural tolerance of species, including carnivores, reduces extinction 
probabilities (Karanth et al. 2010). Compensation for livestock killed by carnivores 
may be important to encourage commercial farmers to tolerate carnivores (Lindsey 
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et al. 2005). However, social marketing campaigns that apply commercial marketing 
concepts and techniques to promote behaviour change have had considerable 
success in influencing undesirable behaviours such as cigarette smoking and illicit 
drug use (Gordon et al. 2006). A social marketing campaign promoting the view 
already held by many farmers, that killing protected carnivores is generally socially 
unacceptable, and encouraging national pride and tolerance towards South Africa’s 
protected carnivores may be an effective way of changing farmers’ behaviour. Any 
behaviour-change intervention will take time to affect a change so enforcement of 
existing laws will continue to be important.  
4.5 Conclusions 
When the subject of a survey is sensitive, as is the case with illegal carnivore 
persecution, it is naïve to expect that respondents will provide honest responses 
when asked questions directly. The randomised response technique allows 
researchers to gain more accurate estimates of sensitive behaviours and we have 
shown that it can be adapted in order to identify indicators of behaviour. Reducing 
carnivore killing could be critical to the persistence of charismatic and declining 
carnivores such as leopard and brown hyena in human-managed landscapes. Our 
results provide evidence that carefully specified attitude statements and people’s 
estimates of the prevalence of sensitive behaviours among their peers may be useful 
indicators of an individual’s involvement in illicit behaviours. Such information can be 
used to identify groups of people to involve in interventions aimed at changing 
behaviour.   
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Chapter 5. Opinions of the public, conservationists, 
and magistrates on sentencing wildlife trade crimes in 
the UK 
 
In press: St. John, F.A.V., Edwards-Jones, G., Jones, J.P.G. Opinions of the public, 
conservationists, and magistrates on sentencing wildlife trade crimes in the UK. 
Environmental Conservation.  
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5.1 Introduction 
Overexploitation of wildlife is one of the principal causes of biodiversity loss (Stuart 
et al. 2004; Bradshaw et al. 2009), and targeted exploitation for international trade 
represents a significant threat (Blundell and Mascia 2005). Globally hundreds of 
millions of plant and animal specimens are traded as traditional medicines, 
bushmeat, ornamental plants, timber, and luxury items such as caviar and furs. The 
legal trade is worth billions of dollars per year (CITES [Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora] 2011) but in addition, there is 
a very substantial illegal trade (Cook et al. 2002). Criminal sentencing has multiple 
purposes, including the punishment and reform of criminals, protection of the public, 
and the reduction of crime through incarceration and by generating deterrence 
(Keane et al. 2008; Roberts et al. 2009). There has been concern that sanctions for 
wildlife trade crimes do not reflect how serious such crimes are in terms of the 
potential illegal profit (House of Commons 2004; Chaber et al. 2010; Johnson 2010), 
the threat status of the species involved, or the level of loss to society (Eagle and 
Betters 1998). However, whilst setting penalties as high as possible may be 
theoretically optimum in some circumstances (Becker 1968) sanctions can be 
counterproductive if they are considered unfair (van Vugt 2009). As such, in addition 
to reflecting how serious a crime is, sanctions should be socially acceptable, for this 
reason public and professional opinions of crimes are often consulted (Roberts et al. 
2009; Sentencing Council 2011). Understanding rule breaking is important for 
developing interventions to improve compliance (St John et al. 2010), however 
wildlife crime in general is under researched (Wilson-Wilde 2010) and little is known 
about how members of judiciaries involved in sanctioning wildlife trade crimes, 
conservationists, or the general public, view offences. 
 
CITES is an international agreement between governments which aims to ensure that 
the international trade in wild plants and animals does not threaten their survival. 
Once a country has ratified the Convention, legislation is required to implement it; 
for example, in the UK, CITES is implemented through both European and domestic 
legislation. Despite the long history of CITES, the fact that it has been signed by 175 
countries, and that numerous domestic and regional laws have been developed to 
enact it, illegal wildlife trade continues. For example a recent study estimated that 
five tonnes of bushmeat, 39% of which were CITES-listed species, were smuggled in 
personal luggage per week through Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris, France (Chaber 
et al. 2010). Further, some of the largest exporters and importers of wildlife 
products, such as Brazil and the USA, are not fully compliant with CITES 
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requirements (Phelps et al. 2010). Eagle and Betters (1998) raised concern that fines 
awarded for infractions of CITES in the USA do not vary appropriately with respect to 
species’ threat status; similarly, sanctions in Europe and Australia tend not to reflect 
the conservation impact of, or the profits gained by wildlife trade criminals (House of 
Commons 2004; Chaber et al. 2010; Johnson 2010). By applying sanctions that 
inadequately take account of the ecological impacts of wildlife crimes and the 
potential profits to be made from such crimes, judiciaries are failing to reimburse 
society for losses and to deter future crimes (Eagle and Betters 1998).  
 
Within England and Wales, magistrates’ courts deal with 97% of all criminal cases 
(Raine and Dunstan 2009). An important guiding principal of sentencing is that the 
sanction should fit the crime. Magistrates initially consider how serious the crime 
was; this can be straightforward if the crime can be assessed in purely economic 
terms (for example by the amount of illegal profit made). However for crimes where 
this is not possible, assessing crime seriousness can be difficult, involving a measure 
of culpability and harm, both of which can be subjective (Raine and Dunstan 2009). 
Magistrates then consider any mitigating or aggravating factors, such as previous 
crimes by the defendant and the defendant’s plea. Further, in order to equalize the 
impact of sanctions on criminals with different circumstances, magistrates are 
required to take into account the financial circumstances of the criminal (Sentencing 
Guidelines Council 2008). In summary, magistrates consider two key factors when 
deciding upon a sentence: (1) crime seriousness, which may include the amount of 
illegal profit made and harm done; and (2) any mitigating or aggravating factors, 
such as the criminal’s plea and previous convictions. To reduce disparity in 
sentencing, guidance is available for different types of crimes (Sentencing Guidelines 
Council 2008). However, the Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines do not include 
guidance on sentencing wildlife trade crimes. The Magistrates’ Association has 
produced a guide focused on environmental crimes to help magistrates in the 
sentencing of such offences (Magistrates’ Association 2009). However, with few 
wildlife trade crimes reaching court, magistrates have limited experience in 
processing such crimes and are unlikely to be familiar with the example prosecutions 
presented (Magistrate, personal communication 2011). Further, defining seriousness 
is particularly challenging, as wildlife trade crimes can be thought of as victimless or 
costless rather than as thefts of public resources motivated by profit (Wilson-Wilde 
2010); cases presented to magistrates often fail to provide adequate information 
about the threat status of species involved (harm caused) or the potential profits to 
be made (House of Commons 2004). 
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In this study, we use conjoint analysis, a method used in marketing to investigate 
the attributes of a product valued by a consumer (Green and Rao 1971), to 
investigate which attributes of wildlife trade offences UK-based conservation 
professionals, magistrates and the general public consider most important when 
sentencing wildlife trade criminals. The principal underlying conjoint analysis is that 
purchasers evaluate the overall desirability of a product using the value of the 
products’ separate parts or attributes. For example, a purchaser’s preference for a 
house may depend upon the conjoined influences of attributes such as distance from 
work, number of rooms or size of garden. By systematically varying these attributes 
and observing the choices made by purchasers, the value of the separate attributes 
can be statistically deduced (Orme 2006). Conjoint analysis has been used in many 
non-marketing contexts, including: animal disease (Cross et al. 2009); health care 
(Ryan and Farrar 2000); environmental planning (Álvarez-Farizo and Hanley 2002); 
willingness to pay for conservation (Hanley et al. 2003); and criminal sentencing 
(Brocke et al. 2004). We developed hypothetical wildlife trade crime profiles that 
varied in respect of attributes presumed to influence the severity of wildlife trade 
crimes in terms of both offence seriousness (taxon, trade protection owing to threat 
status as given by European Union [EU] Annexes and illegal profit) and mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances (previous convictions and plea). 
 
5.2 Methods 
Survey instrument 
The survey was made up of three parts: a brief information section which included 
photos of wildlife known to be traded including whole animals, by-products and eggs; 
15 conjoint tasks; and a demographic section (for complete survey see Appendix 4). 
Attributes of wildlife trade crimes investigated were: taxon, trade protection, illegal 
profit, previous convictions and a defendant’s plea (Table 1). Full-profile conjoint 
analysis tasks, designed using Sawtooth Software SSI Web 7 (Sawtooth Software 
Inc. 2010), were presented to respondents. For each conjoint task they were 
required to indicate on a five-point scale which of the two offences they would award 
the higher sentence to, or if they would award the same sentence to both offences 
(Figure 5.1).  
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Table 5.1 Attributes and levels included in the conjoint analysis tasks 
Attribute  Attribute levels Rationale 
Taxon Birds 
Fish 
Reptiles  
Mammals 
Including whole animals, their by-products, or 
eggs. 
Items from each of these 
categories are traded 
illegally. It is unknown if 
species charisma 
influences opinion of 
crime seriousness. 
 
 
 
Trade 
protection 
(I) Trade allowed only in exceptional 
circumstances. 
EU Annex A: Species face extremely high risk 
of extinction in the wild. International trade is 
prohibited except when it is non-commercial 
when an export permit and import permit 
must be granted and a re-export permit is 
required if the specimen is re-exported. 
 
(II) Trade allowed, permits always required. 
EU Annex B: Species may become threatened 
with extinction unless international trade is 
controlled. International trade is permitted but 
requires an export permit. A re-export permit 
is required if the specimen is to be re-
exported outside of the EU. 
 
(III) Trade allowed, permits occasionally 
required. 
EU Annex C: Species are mostly widespread 
and abundant but trade is regulated in some 
EU States. International trade is permitted but 
a certificate of origin is required when 
importing into the EU. Export or re-export 
permits are required when exporting outside 
of the EU.  
In the UK the legal trade 
in wildlife products is 
permitted under the EU 
Wildlife Trade Regulation 
(EC) No. 338/97 which 
groups species into four 
Annexes A – D according 
to the degree of 
protection required. This 
study uses the EU 
Annexes to convey the 
conservation impact of 
the crime committed. To 
simplify the EU Annexes 
for respondents they 
were informed that 
animals are afforded one 
of three levels of trade 
protection: (I) trade 
allowed only in 
exceptional 
circumstances; (II) trade 
allowed, permits always 
required; (III) trade 
allowed, permits 
occasionally required. 
The Magistrates’ 
Association (2009) 
suggests that the 
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Attribute  Attribute levels
Illegal 
profit 
£500 
£10,000 
£100,000  
Similar 
previous 
convictions 
Previous convictions
No previous convictions
 
Defendant’s 
plea 
Not guilty  
Guilty 
 
 
Figure 5.1 An example of a conjoint analysis task. Respondents are required to 
indicate which of the two offences they would award the higher sentence to, or if 
they would award equal sentences to both. 
 
The five attributes and 14 attribute levels were combined to construct a 4 × 3 × 3 × 
2 × 2 factoral design measuring main
levels (Table 1). Conjoint task design allowed for attributes and levels to be 
independent of each other to ensure efficient estimation of utilities. However, 
because the number of conjoint tasks presented to respondents was limited to avoid 
respondent fatigue, the design was not entirely orthogonal (i.e. the design did not 
achieve zero correlation between attributes). Whilst the software produces high 
 
 Rationale
potential impact on 
biodiversity of a wildlife 
crime should be taken
into account. 
The level of illegal 
economic gain is 
considered by 
magistrates (Sentencing 
Guidelines Council 2008).
 
 
Previous convictions, 
a defendant’s plea are 
considered by 
magistrates (Sentencing 
Guidelines Council 2008)
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quality designs, it is unlikely to be orthogonal or completely balanced if design 
constraints are applied, such as asking fewer than the optimal number of conjoint 
tasks. This study has ten parameters to be estimated (calculated as: total number of 
levels – number of attributes + 1). It is recommended that respondents complete 
three times the number of conjoint tasks as there are parameters in the study; or a 
minimum of 1.5 × the number of parameters in the study (Sawtooth Software Inc. 
2010). According to these guidelines, the optimal range of conjoint tasks in this 
study was between 15 and 30. Since 30 conjoint tasks are too many for respondents 
to continue to provide high quality responses, the minimum of 15 was assessed. 
Reducing the number of conjoint tasks had minimal impact on the design efficiency, 
decreasing it to 0.97 (where 1.0 indicates an orthogonal design) (Sawtooth Software 
Inc. 1997). To reduce psychological effects such as question order and context bias 
(Schwarz and Sudman 1992), three versions of the survey were generated; each 
version presented a unique set of conjoint tasks. These were distributed randomly to 
respondents in approximately equal quantities.  
Data collection 
The survey was piloted on colleagues and improved before a formal pilot with 31 
members of the general public. No further changes were required, so the pilot data 
(n = 31) were included in the final analysis of data from the general public. Identical 
online surveys were created for completion by conservation professionals and 
magistrates.  
Data collection – conservation professionals 
A sampling frame was developed from the online list of organizations involved in the 
UK Biodiversity Action Plan (JNCC [Joint Nature Conservation Committee] 2010). 
Hobby groups, companies whose primary function was not conservation or natural 
resource management, and socioeconomic enterprise projects were excluded from 
the sampling frame, leaving 321 organizations. Between 21 and 26 October 2010, 
195 organizations received a survey invite by e-mail (from Freya St John), which 
included an http link to start the online survey. Survey invites were staggered over a 
number of days to avoid the survey running slowly in the event that many people 
attempted to access it at any one time. All invitees were informed that they might 
forward the survey link to colleagues and friends working for conservation 
organizations. Where personal contacts of the authors existed within an organization 
included in the sampling frame, they were contacted individually. The maximum 
sample size (limited by the academic license for Sawtooth) of 250 was reached prior 
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to all 321 organizations on the sampling frame being contacted. The online survey 
closed on 17 November 2010. 
Data collection – magistrates (Justices of the Peace) 
Four Clerks to the Justices in Wales agreed to send out the survey invitation. 
Between October and November 2010, magistrates presiding in Welsh courts 
received an email survey invitation (composed by Freya St John) from the personal 
assistant of their Clerk to the Justices. The survey invite included an http link which 
started the survey. The online survey closed on 17 January 2011, by which time 182 
magistrates (9.8% of magistrates presiding in Welsh courts; trained identically to 
those in England) had completed the survey. 
Data collection – general public 
Following the approach taken by Nilsen et al. (2007) for sampling the general public, 
we approached potential respondents (aged 18 to 65 years) in public places such as 
cafés and trains in rural and urban locations in England and Wales. We varied survey 
location, and specifically targeted under-sampled groups to achieve a sample close to 
the UK population in terms of gender, age and income (based on the 2001 National 
Census; Office for National Statistics 2008). Between September 2010 and April 
2011, 250 people completed the survey. As we did not apply strict probability 
sampling (Newing 2011), the sample is unlikely to perfectly represent the UK general 
population and so results should be interpreted with a degree of caution in this 
respect. 
Data analysis 
The relative preference for attributes and attribute levels presented in the 
hypothetical wildlife trade crime scenarios were calculated for each of the three 
groups using hierarchical Bayes estimation in SSI Web 7 (Sawtooth Software Inc. 
2010). This analysis estimates a hierarchical random coefficients model using a 
Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithm. At the upper level, this hierarchical model 
considers respondents as members of a population of similar individuals whose part-
worth estimations are assumed to have multivariate normal distribution described by 
a vector of means and a matrix of variances and covariances. At the lower level, each 
respondent’s part-worth estimations are assumed to be related to their overall 
ratings of the crime profiles presented in the conjoint survey, by a linear regression 
model. Because each respondent is assumed to come from a population of similar 
individuals, when estimating parameters, information can be ‘borrowed’ from 
respondents. Such an approach enhances parameter estimation compared to 
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ordinary regression analysis; full details of the model are available in Sawtooth 
Software Inc. (2002). Data were further analysed using PAWS Statistics 18 (SPSS 
Inc., Chicago, USA). The mean preferences for attributes were compared on a 
common scale by calculating the ranges (highest to lowest) of the hierarchical Bayes 
estimations for all levels within an attribute, and dividing them by the sum of all the 
utility ranges (Home et al. 2009). Utility estimates were non-normal, so were 
analysed using non-parametric tests for differences between groups. 
5.3 Results 
Three surveys completed by members of the public were excluded from analysis 
because too few conjoint tasks had been completed. Following hierarchical Bayes 
analysis, 84 respondents across the three groups were excluded from further analysis 
due to low internal consistency of responses across conjoint tasks (correlation 
coefficient < 0.5) (Brocke et al. 2004). The final sample represents data from 226 
conservation professionals, 176 magistrates and 193 members of the public. The 
gender ratio of those sampled was approximately equal for each group, with 50.9%, 
51.3% and 47.2% female for conservation professionals, magistrates and the public, 
respectively. The median age of conservation professionals was 37 (inter-quartile 
range 17, n = 225), 61 for magistrates (inter-quartile range 11, n = 173), and 34 for 
the general public (inter-quartile range 22, n = 167). In terms of educational 
background, 89.8% (n = 203) of conservation professionals, 74.4% (n = 131) of 
magistrates and 63.7% (n = 123) of the general public were educated to degree 
level or higher. Compared to national statistics (Office for National Statistics 2008), 
our sample of the public are unrepresentative of the underlying population in terms 
of education level, as too many people educated to degree level or higher were 
sampled; we also oversampled people aged 20–24 and under sampled those aged 
45–59 years (age categories derived from Office for National Statistics 2008). 
Compared to the magistrate population of England and Wales (Judiciary of England 
and Wales 2011), the only group where the sample data were unrepresentative of 
the underlying population was for magistrates aged 40–49 years, where too few were 
sampled. 
 
The mean preferences (utility value) for wildlife trade crime attributes of the three 
groups (conservation professional, magistrates and the general public) were derived 
using hierarchical Bayes estimation and shown on a common scale (Figure 5.2). 
Magistrates and the general public placed most importance on the amount of illegal 
profit made by criminals, whereas conservation professionals placed most importance 
on the EU Annex of the species involved. Therefore it appears that magistrates and 
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the public initially considered how much profit the criminal made before considering 
other crime attributes, whereas conservation professionals thought first and foremost 
about the threat status of the species involved. There was a statistically significant 
difference between the three groups (n = 595) in the importance they placed on the 
taxon involved (Kruskal-Wallis test H = 69.1, p < 0.001), its EU Annex (p < 0.001), 
the illegal profit made (p < 0.001) and defendant’s plea (p = 0.05). However there 
was no statistically significant difference between groups with respect to the 
importance they placed on defendants’ previous convictions (p = 0.75).  
 
 
Figure 5.2 The relative importance of attributes (expressed as a percentage) of 
hypothetical wildlife trade offences as viewed by conservation professionals, 
magistrates, and the general public. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Following illegal profit, magistrates and the general public both considered that the 
EU Annex of the species involved was the second most important attribute 
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determining the seriousness of a crime. The general public then considered taxon to 
be the third most important attribute, placing significantly greater importance on 
whether the species illegally traded was a mammal, bird, reptile or fish, than 
conservation professionals and magistrates. All groups considered the defendant’s 
plea to be the least important attribute, however, both magistrates and the public, 
who did not differ significantly with respect to this attribute (Mann-Whitney U test 
16 317.0, p = 0.515, n = 369), placed significantly greater importance on this 
attribute as compared to conservation professionals. 
 
Results indicate that there are more discrepancies between the opinions of 
conservation professionals and either magistrates (differing significantly on EU Annex 
[Mann-Whitney U test p < 0.001], illegal profit [p < 0.001] and plea [p = 0.002]), or 
the public (differing significantly on taxon [p < 0.001], EU Annex [p < 0.001] and 
plea [p = 0.016]), than there are between magistrates and the public, who held 
significantly different opinions on just two attributes, namely taxon (p < 0.001) and 
illegal profit (p < 0.001). 
 
The percentage of respondents aged above and below 45 years differed significantly 
by group (χ2 = 188.33, p = < 0.001, n = 593). Most magistrates (90.9%, n = 160) 
were ≥ 45 years old, whilst just 32.0% (n = 72) of conservation professionals and 
26.6% (n = 51) of the public were ≥ 45 years old. To understand if differences in 
reported preferences for attributes between groups (Figure 5.2) were the result of 
differences in age, data gathered from each group were analysed to see if there were 
significant differences in attribute preference for respondents within groups aged 
above and below 45 years. There were no significant differences for conservation 
professionals (Mann-Whitney U tests: taxon p = 0.266; EU Annex p = 0.096; illegal 
profit p = 0.426; previous convictions p = 0.993; plea p = 0.624); magistrates 
(taxon p = 0.688; EU Annex p = 0.789; illegal profit p = 0.253; previous convictions 
p = 0.186; plea p = 0.121); or the public: (taxon p = 0.889; EU Annex p = 0.469; 
illegal profit p = 0.374; previous convictions p = 0.943; plea p = 0.627). 
 
We analysed the degree of preference for each of the levels within each attribute (for 
example, within the attribute taxon, there are four levels: mammals, birds, fish and 
reptiles) (Figure 5.3). Within their most preferred attribute of illegal profit, 
magistrates and the general public placed most importance on criminals making an 
illegal profit of £ 100 000 (£ 1 = c. US$ 1.59 in Jan 2011); the more illegal profit the 
criminal stood to gain, the more serious these groups considered the crime to be. 
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Conservation professionals placed the most importance on the attribute EU Annex, 
and within this attribute they placed most importance on illegal consignments 
containing Annex A species; the higher the threat status of the species involved, the 
more serious conservation professional considered the crime to be. There were 
statistically significant differences between the three groups and the degree of 
preference they placed on different levels; for example, with respect to taxon, the 
public indicated a greater preference for mammals, and non-preference for fish, 
compared to conservation professionals and magistrates (Figure 5.3), namely they 
would punish a criminal illegally trading mammals more harshly than a criminal 
illegally trading fish, birds or reptiles. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Relative preferences for levels within an attribute. Data are zero-centred 
such that the mean preference of all attributes within each level sum to zero. Error 
bars show 95% confidence intervals.  
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5.4 Discussion 
This study is unique in presenting data from magistrates, as access to whom is 
heavily restricted, as well as conservation professionals and the general public, thus 
giving a range of perspectives on the sentencing of wildlife trade crimes. Our results 
show that magistrates placed most importance upon economic gains resulting from 
wildlife trade crimes. This is consistent with the manner in which they assess other 
more commonly processed offences for which sentencing guidelines exist, such as 
the evasion of alcohol or tobacco duty. In assessing the seriousness of such an 
offence, magistrates consider the level of duty evaded and the amount of personal 
profit made by the criminal, in addition to aggravating (for example repeated criminal 
offences, criminal played organizational role) and mitigating (for example timely 
guilty plea, criminal assisted police with inquiry) factors before deciding upon a 
sentence which must be within the range given in the guidelines (Sentencing 
Guidelines Council 2008). Similarly, given that conservation professionals are familiar 
with the potential threat that illegal wildlife trade poses to the continued existence of 
some species in the wild (Shivji et al. 2005; Shepherd and Nijman 2008), it is 
perhaps unsurprising that they considered the potential ecological impact of the 
offence to be the most serious aspect of the crime. It has been suggested that the 
public do not hold a coherent opinion regarding sentencing and that they are 
‘punitive sentencers’ who focus only on the details of the harm done, ignoring 
characteristics of the criminal which may be mitigating (Durham 1993). However, 
more recent research suggests that, in determining which factors make a crime 
serious, there is a close fit between judicial practice and public opinion (Roberts et al. 
2009). Our study reports similar findings, with few discrepancies between opinions of 
the public and magistrates in considering the relative importance of attributes 
affecting offence seriousness with respect to wildlife trade crimes. Indeed, our results 
suggest that the public are less punitive than conservation professionals, who 
showed greater insensitivity to mitigating characteristics of criminals. 
 
Whilst magistrates place more importance on the illegal economic gain than on the 
conservation impact of the crime, economic value and rarity are related (Angulo et 
al. 2009). As such, by considering economic gain to be the key factor determining 
crime seriousness, by default magistrates may be punishing offences proportionally 
in accordance with the threat status of the species involved. However, because 
magistrates must judge criminals’ ability to pay a fine and consider reducing 
sanctions in response to offender mitigation (such as a timely guilty plea), fines are 
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frequently lowered. Sanctions may thus become too low to act as an effective 
deterrent to repeat and future criminals, particularly those who stand to make 
considerable profit from illegally traded wildlife products such as white rhino horn, 
which may attract a price upwards of £ 30 000 kg-1 in China (UK Border Agency 
2010).  
 
Efforts to curb illegal wildlife trade need a clear understanding of how society, 
experts and those directly involved in punishing illegal wildlife trade view the 
seriousness of such crimes. This study presents findings from a single high-income 
country. Although only a single case study, it raises some important points with 
broader relevance. In common with the few other studies to directly investigate the 
attitudes of conservationists and the general public towards wildlife policy (Hanley et 
al. 2003; Koval and Mertig 2004), this study has identified differences in opinions 
between conservationists and non-conservationists. Whilst conservationists perceive 
the degree of ecological damage to be the most punishable attribute of a crime, the 
public and magistrates do not see the world this way, instead perceiving the size of 
economic gain to be the most punishable attribute of a crime. Such information can 
be used to improve the way in which conservationists communicate with others who 
do not share the same world view. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
We have shown how conjoint analysis, most frequently used to identify which 
attributes of a product are most desirable to consumers, can be a useful tool for 
identifying differences between groups of people and their perspectives on policy 
issues, such as factors affecting the seriousness of a crime. Reducing wildlife trade 
crime may be critical to the persistence of many species. Our results suggest that 
magistrates, when presented with appropriate information on the conservation 
impact of wildlife trade offences, do consider the threat status and corresponding 
legal protection afforded to wildlife when considering offence seriousness, and that 
doing so is in line with public opinion. This study highlights the importance of 
ensuring that judiciaries are presented with information of the potential profit and 
conservation impact of wildlife trade crimes. We urge sentencing councils to develop 
appropriate guidelines to support judiciaries in their sentencing of wildlife crimes. 
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Chapter 6. Do sanctions reflect the conservation 
impact of wildlife crimes?  
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6.1 Introduction 
Species declines and extinctions are widely attributed to human activities including 
over exploitation (Bradshaw et al. 2009; Stuart et al. 2004). Exploitation is often 
illegal, and wildlife crimes including the prohibited harming, killing, or collection of 
wild species, and the evasion of trade restrictions continue to threaten the existence 
of many species (Blundell and Mascia 2005; Shivji et al. 2005). Law enforcement, 
which includes the sanctioning of detected infractions, plays an important role in 
successful natural resource management (Keane et al. 2008).There is concern that 
sanctions for wildlife crimes do not vary with respect to the threat status and 
corresponding legal protection afforded to species, and that they do not reflect 
potential economic gains (Chaber et al. 2010; Eagle and Betters 1998; House of 
Commons 2004; Johnson 2010). As such, wildlife crimes may be viewed as low risk, 
high reward ventures for offenders (House of Commons 2004). Wildlife crime is 
generally under researched (Wilson-Wilde 2010) and, whilst some have investigated 
wildlife crime sanctioning (Alacs and Georges 2008) it is unclear how sanctions relate 
to the conservation impact of wildlife crimes. 
In the United Kingdom wildlife crime is regulated by a suite of legislative levers 
including those which enforce the Convention on the International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), and those which offer 
protection to the flora and fauna of the UK. Wildlife crimes may be prosecuted under 
one of three legal instruments: (1) the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979; 
(2) Control of Trade in Endangered Species (Enforcement) Regulations 1997; and (3) 
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. Violations of the European Union Wildlife Trade 
Regulation (EC) No. 338/97 which incorporates all of the provisions of CITES 
(Appendix 5), as well as additional stricter measures, occur under the Customs and 
Excise Management Act 1979 (CEMA) for offences detected at ports of entry to the 
UK. However, violations of this regulation detected within the UK should be 
prosecuted under the Control of Trade in Endangered Species (Enforcement) 
Regulations 1997 (COTES).  Wildlife crimes which occur within the UK, involving non-
CITES species are prosecuted under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (WCA).  
Sentencing powers available to the courts differ depending upon which legislation 
wildlife crimes are prosecuted under (Table 6.1). Cases prosecuted under CEMA or 
COTES can be sent to Crown Court if a magistrate believes an offence warrants a 
higher penalty than can be awarded under their jurisdiction (this is not possible for 
cases prosecuted under the WCA). Of the three regulations, CEMA has the highest 
maximum sanctions. However, magistrates prosecuting offences under the WCA have 
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the sentencing power to award penalties in respect of every single specimen involved 
in the offence as if each were a separate offence.  
Table 6.1 Legislation protecting wildlife (Magistrate's Association 2009) 
Legislation Penalty 
The Customs and Excise 
Management Act 1979 (CEMA) 
… a person guilty of an offence under this 
section shall be liable - (a) on summary 
convictiona, to a penalty of the prescribed sum 
or of three times the value of the goods, 
whichever is the greater, or to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to both; 
or  
(b) on conviction on indictmentb, to a penalty 
of any amount, or to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding [7 years] or to both. 
The Control of Trade in 
Endangered Species 
(Enforcement) Regulations 1997 
(COTES) 
(8) A person guilty of an offence shall be liable 
- (a) on summary convictiona, to a fine not 
exceeding level 5c on the standard scale or to a 
term of imprisonment not exceeding six 
months, or to both; and 
(b) on conviction on indictmentb, to a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding five years or to a 
fine, or to both. 
The Wildlife and Countryside Act 
1981 (WCA) 
 
21(1) Subject to subsection (5), a person guilty 
of an offence shall be liable on summary 
convictiona to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding 
level 5c on the standard scale, or to both. 
21(5) Where an offence to which subs (1) 
applies was committed in respect of more than 
one bird, nest, egg, other animal, plant or 
other thing, the maximum fine which may be 
imposed … shall be determined as if the person 
convicted had been convicted of a separate 
offence in respect of each bird, nest, egg, 
animal, plant or thing. 
a Sentenced at Magistrates court. 
b Sent to Crown Court where power of sentencing is greater. 
c Level 5 maximum value £5,000 (Sentencing Guidelines Council 2008). 
 
When hearing cases magistrates follow steps laid down in sentencing guidelines 
which state what sanctions are available for different types of offences. The first step 
is to assess offence seriousness for example, consider the evasion of alcohol duty: 
what was the value of tax evaded? The second step is to consider aggravating and 
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mitigating factors: the defendant played an organisational role (aggravating); or, the 
defendant played a minor role (mitigating). Magistrates use such information to form 
a preliminary view of the appropriate sentence; they must then consider reducing the 
sentence if the defendant pleaded guilty. Further, in order to equalise the impact of 
sanctions on defendants, magistrates must consider the financial circumstances of 
the offender when deciding upon a sentence (Sentencing Guidelines Council 2008). 
Wildlife crimes are not included in the Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines (see 
Chapter 5 for a discussion of sentencing wildlife crimes in magistrates’ courts of 
England and Wales).  
Whilst sentencing powers available to the courts in the UK are considered sufficient 
(House of Commons 2004; The Scottish Government 2008), it is unclear if sanctions 
vary with respect to the conservation impact of crimes. This study explores sanctions 
awarded within the UK for wildlife crimes prosecuted over a 23 year period from 
1987 to 2010 focusing on the relationships between sanction severity and the 
conservation impact of offences as determined by the protection status (CITES or 
WCA) of the specimens involved in the crimes. 
6.2 Methods 
Wildlife crimes resulting in cautions or prosecutions are not classified as recordable 
meaning they are not recorded on any central government system (House of 
Commons 2004), as such they cannot be accessed in this manner. Records of UK 
wildlife crime prosecutions were provided by TRAFFIC the wildlife trade monitoring 
network and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB). Additional 
prosecution records were found within the Bat Conservation Trust’s annual crime 
reports. These organisations collate prosecution information when they know cases 
are being presented in courts either because they are involved in the cases, or are 
informed of cases by other agencies. Given the level of effort dedicated by these 
organisations in collating data on wildlife crime prosecutions within their specialist 
areas we make the assumption that these data represent a census of wildlife trade, 
bird, and bat prosecutions for the years where data were available (TRAFFIC: 1987 – 
2010; RSPB: 1995 – 2009, and Bat Conservation Trust: 2000 – 2006).   
Each wildlife crime prosecution was coded to allow for comparison between 
prosecutions (Table 6.2). The right hand column of Table 6.2 illustrates how the 
prosecution record presented in Box 6.1 was coded when entered into PASW 
Statistics (Predictive Analytics SoftWare Statistics, IBM, New York, USA). 
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Box 6.1 An example wildlife crime prosecution record provided by TRAFFIC 
Southwark Crown Court, 2001. Species involved: tantalus monkey (Chlorocebus 
tantalus), African pangolin (Smutsia temminckii), rock python skin (Python molurus), 
and monitor skins (Veranus spp.). Protection status: CITES Appendix II, EU Annex B. 
Prosecuted for possession and trade in illegally imported goods under Section 170 of 
the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979. Penalty: four months imprisonment. 
 
Table 6.2 Coding of prosecution details 
Variable name Variable details Example case: from Box 
6.1 
ID Case ID number 
sequentially assigned 
when entering data 
79 
Data source TRAFFIC 
RSPB 
Bat Conservation Trust 
TRAFFIC 
Year of prosecution Year  2001 
Country of prosecution England and Wales 
Scotland 
England and Wales 
 
Regulation 
 
 
COTES 
CEMA 
WCA 
Other 
CEMA 
Case details Details of specimens 
involved in offence, and 
type of offence 
(1) Tantalus monkey 
(Chlorocebus tantalus), 
(2) African pangolin 
(Smutsia temminckii),  
(3) Rock python skin 
(Python molurus),  
(4) Monitor skins (Varanus 
spp.) 
Protection status (CITES)  Appendix I 
Appendix II 
WCA 
Appendix II 
 
Protection status (EU 
Annex) 
Annex A Annex B 
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Variable name Variable details Example case: from Box 
6.1 
Annex B 
WCA 
 
Taxon Bird 
Mammal 
Reptile / Amphibian 
Fish 
Plant 
Arthropod 
Mixed taxa 
Mixed taxa 
Number of specimens One specimen 
Multiple specimens 
Multiple specimens 
Potential illegal Profit Illegal profit value 
available 
Illegal profit value not 
available 
Not available 
Sanction type Prison 
Suspended prison 
Fine 
Community service order 
Conditional discharge 
Youth referral order 
Other 
Admonished 
Absolute discharge 
Prison 
Prison sentence duration Numeric value (months) 4 
Fine (GBP) as recorded in 
the year of prosecution 
Numeric value (GBP) Not applicable (-1) 
Fine (GBP) corrected for 
inflation to 2010 values 
Numeric value (GBP) Not applicable (-1) 
Community service order 
duration 
Numeric value (hours) Not applicable (-1) 
 
Prosecutions frequently involved multiple wildlife specimens from multiple CITES or 
EU Annexes; in such instances prosecutions were coded according to the highest 
CITES Appendix, and EU Annex contained within illegal consignments. Some 
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prosecutions were punished with multiple sanctions; such prosecutions were coded 
according to the toughest sanction awarded (in declining order: prison, suspended 
prison, fine, community service order, conditional discharge, youth referral order, 
other, admonished, and absolute discharge). So that the financial value of fines could 
be compared across years, all fines were adjusted to take account of inflation using 
the Retail Price Index Table RP02 using the following formula: Sum of money (GBP) x 
(Later date RPI / Earlier date RPI; 2010) (Office for National Statistics 2011). 
Data analysis 
To examine the relationship between protection status and the severity of different 
types of sanctions; and with respect to WCA offences, the affect of single and 
multiple specimens on sanction severity; non-parametric kernel distribution plots 
were made using R v. 2.12.0 (R Development Core Team 2010). Kernel distribution 
plots are one way of displaying the distribution of random continuous variables based 
upon their probability density function, i.e. the relative likelihood of the random 
variable occurring at a given point (Scott et al. 2001). 
6.3 Results 
Cases that were dismissed upon reaching court (n = 16), or where the defendant was 
declared not guilty (n = 42) were not considered in the analysis; a further 85 cases 
were excluded from analysis because, whilst being offences under the WCA, they did 
not involve an animal or plant species directly (e.g. the defendant was found to 
possess egg collecting equipment which could be used to commit an offence). The 
remaining sample described contains 696 wildlife crimes (542 from RSPB, 139 from 
TRAFFIC, and 15 from The Bat Conservation Trust) which were prosecuted between 
1987 and 2010.  Most offences involved birds (85.4%, n = 595), possibly reflecting 
the source of the data, while 5.5% (n = 38) involved mammals, 3.0% (n = 21) 
involved reptiles or amphibians, 0.9% (n = 6) involved plants, 0.3% (n = 2) involved 
fish, 0.1% (n = 1) involved arthropods, 3.2% (n = 22) involved multiple taxa while 
taxa were unknown for the remaining 1.7% (n = 12) of cases. The proportion of 
prosecutions for each taxon, split by protection status are presented in Figure 6.1.  
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Figure 6.1 The proportion of prosec
taxon. For each protection status, most prosecutions were for offences involving 
birds.  
 
Legal instrument  
The majority of prosecutions (54.9%, 
= 140) were made under COTES; 7.2% (
27) of prosecutions occurred under other legal instruments including the 
Conservation (Natural Habitats) Regulations 1994 and various animal protection and 
animal health acts. It was not possible to id
13.9% (n = 97) of prosecutions were made under. 
Protection status: EU Annexes, CITES Appendices and the WCA
Nearly half of the prosecutions (49.8%, 
species, and 42.7% (n = 2
taking a bird from the wild). There was insufficient species information to assign 
protected status to the remaining 7.5% (
mean that this information was not made available to the courts. 
 
 
utions for each protection status presented by 
n = 382) were made under the WCA; 20.1% (
n = 50) were made under CEMA; 3.9% (
entify which regulation the remaining 
 
n = 347) involved CITES and EU Annex listed 
97) were offences under the WCA (e.g. injuring, killing or 
n = 52) of cases. This does not necessarily 
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n 
n = 
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In many instances trade restrictions under the EU Annexes are stricter than CITES. 
For example Eleonora’s falcon (Falco eleonorae) is listed on Annex A of the EU 
regulations (akin to CITES Appendix I), yet is listed on Appendix II of CITES. For this 
reason whilst the total number of prosecutions known to involve specimens listed 
under the EU Regulations and the Convention is the same (n = 347), the proportion 
of prosecutions involving Annex A, or CITES Appendix I specimens differs. In terms 
of the EU regulations 91.6% (n = 318) of the defendants prosecuted committed 
offences involving Annex A species; whilst 8.4% (n = 29) of defendants were 
prosecuted for offences involving Annex B species. However, in terms of CITES, 
40.3% (n = 140) of defendants were prosecuted for offences involving Appendix I 
species; whilst 59.7% (n = 207) were prosecuted for offences involving Appendix II 
specimens. Because CITES is a global Convention, we explored the relationship 
between sanctioning and the level of legal protection violated in respect of CITES, 
rather than EU Annexes. In addition we explore the sanctioning of non-CITES 
offences i.e. acts considered crimes under the WCA. 
Types of sanctions awarded 
The most common form of sanction awarded was a fine (57.5%, n = 400, this 
includes three defendants who also received conditional discharges), followed by a 
conditional discharge (16.7%, n = 116). In 9.8% (n = 68) of cases offenders were 
sentenced to time in prison (this includes one offender who also received an 18 
month suspended prison sentence; one who also received a conditional discharge; 
three who were also fined; and three who also received community service orders). 
Just over six percent (6.3 %, n = 44) of offenders were awarded community service 
orders whilst 2.7% (n = 19) of offences involved youths who were awarded youth 
referral orders. Just over two percent (2.4%, n = 17) of offenders received 
suspended prison sentences and 0.7% (n = 5) received other types of sanctions such 
as curfew orders. Over two percent (2.6%, n = 18) of cases were admonished 
(defendants were found guilty, but the offences were considered minor so defendants 
were dismissed with a reprimand), and 1.3% (n = 9) of cases received an absolute 
discharge (the court considered it unsuitable to inflict punishment).  
The type of sanction awarded differed with the protection status of the specimens 
involved in the offence, for example, prison sentences were more frequently awarded 
for offences involving CITES Appendix I specimens (Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2 The proportion of prosecutions for each protection status awarded 
different types of sanctions. 
 
Sanction severity and protection 
Data regarding the second most common form of sanction (conditional discharge) 
was insufficiently detailed 
charge was usually unavailable, only a yes / no report as to weather a 
discharge was awarded. The study focused instead on the first (fine), third (prison), 
and fourth (community service), most commonly applied types of sanctions which 
account jointly for 73.6% (
Kernel distribution plots illustrate how the severity of these three types of sanctions 
differed with protection status
sanctions awarded for offences involving CITES Appendix I species
sanctions awarded for offences involving Appendix II species, or offences under the 
WCA. For example the kernel densities for imprisonment 
all WCA offences that received prison sentences were distributed between one and 
six months, whereas the distribution of prison sentences for Appendix I offences 
spreads from 1.5 to 78 months, with a peak at four months indicating that this was 
 
 
status 
for inclusion in the analysis to follow; the duration of the 
n = 512) of all sanctions awarded for wildlife crime
 (Figure 6.3). The kernel densities indicate that 
 were greater than 
(Figure 6.3, top)
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the sentence duration most frequently awarded. Summary distribution details of the 
data displayed in Figure 6.3 are presented in Table 6.3. 
Chapter 6. Do sanctions reflect conservation impact? 
84 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Distribution of prison sentences, fines, and hours of community service 
awarded to defendants found guilty of committing offences in respect of CITES 
Appendix I or II species, or offences under the Wildlife and Countryside Act.  
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Table 6.3 Summary distribution of sanction severity of Appendix I, II, and WCA 
offences 
 Appendix I Appendix II WCA 
Imprisonment (months)    
Minimum 1.5 1.5 1 
Maximum 78 10 6 
Median 9.5 4 3.75 
n 34 15 16 
Fine (GBP)    
Minimum 65 48 62 
Maximum 11,287 8,518 5,988 
Median 852 676 466 
n 72 121 173 
Community service order (hours)     
Minimum 100 6 18 
Maximum 250 200 280 
Median 160 125 120 
n 10 12 26 
 
Sanction severity and quantity of specimens – WCA offences 
Kernel densities indicate that the severity of sanctions awarded for offences under 
the WCA differed with the number of specimens involved in the offence (Figure 6.4). 
For each of the three sanction types, harsher sanctions were awarded for offences 
involving multiple, rather than single specimens. For example the kernel densities for 
community service orders (Figure 6.4, bottom) peak at 100 hours for offences 
involving single specimens, and 120 hours for offences involving multiple specimens 
showing that these were the most frequently awarded sentence durations for 
offences involving single and multiple specimens. Summary distribution details of the 
data displayed in Figure 6.4 are presented in Table 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 The distribution of prison sentences, fines, and hours of community 
service awarded to defendants found guilty of committing offences under the Wildlife 
and Countryside Act involving multiple, and single specimens. Larger sanctions were 
awarded for offences involving multiple, rather than single specimens. 
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Table 6.4 Summary distribution of sanction severity for WCA offences involving 
multiple and single specimens 
 Multiple specimens Single specimen 
Imprisonment (months)   
Minimum 1 2 
Maximum 6 4 
Median 3.5 3.75 
n 12 4 
Fine (GBP)   
Minimum 69 62 
Maximum 5,988 2,999 
Median 525 341 
n 115 56 
Community service order (hours)    
Minimum 70 18 
Maximum 280 100 
Median 120 100 
n 20 5 
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
Human activities including the exploitation of wildlife, which in some instances is 
criminal, pose a threat to global biodiversity (Agnew et al. 2009; Bulte and Horan 
2003; Laurance et al. 2004). Wildlife crimes may be viewed as thefts of public 
resources (Wilson-Wilde 2010) and punishing wildlife criminals is one way of 
reimbursing society’s losses. There is concern that sanctions for wildlife crimes do not 
vary appropriately with the threat status of species (Eagle and Betters 1998), fail to 
reflect conservation damage, and may be an inadequate deterrent (House of 
Commons 2004). Whilst some work has looked at how awarded fines relate to 
economic values that people place on species survival (Eagle and Betters 1998), and 
how sentencing strategies might affect behaviour (Milner-Gulland and Leader-
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Williams 1992), there appears to be a lack of empirical analysis on how sanctions 
awarded for actual wildlife crimes relate to conservation impact. 
This study investigated the relationship between the conservation impact of wildlife 
crimes and the severity of sanctions awarded by courts in the UK over a 23 year 
period. The results suggest that sanctions vary with respect to the protection status 
of the species involved. Prison sentences, and suspended prison sentences, the 
harshest sanctions available, were most frequently awarded for crimes against the 
most highly protected species which are listed on Appendix I of CITES. Longer prison 
sentences were awarded for crimes involving Appendix I species, than for crimes 
which did not. Alternative types of sanctions, such as fines and community service 
orders, were more frequently used to sanction crimes which had a lower conservation 
impact (Appendix II, or WCA offences). However, as with prison sentences, the 
highest fines and longest community service orders were awarded for crimes 
involving Appendix I species. Offences under the WCA which involved multiple 
specimens received higher penalties compared to offences involving single 
specimens, suggesting that magistrates were using their sentencing powers to punish 
offenders for each wildlife specimen against which an offence had been committed.   
Whilst the finding that sanctions vary with protection status is positive, sanctions 
awarded for wildlife crimes may not be sufficient to deter offenders, particularly 
those who stand to make considerable profits (Cook et al. 2002). Most wildlife crimes 
were prosecuted under COTES or the WCA which have lower maximum penalty limits 
for wildlife crimes compared to countries such as America (criminal penalties of up to 
US$50,000 (~£30,700) and / or up to one year in prison; civil penalty of up to 
US$25,000 (~£15,400)), or Australia (AUD$ 110,000 (~£74,200) and / or up to ten 
years in prison). Further, because UK judiciaries must consider an offender’s ability 
to pay a fine, and consider reducing sanctions in response to offender mitigation 
(e.g. timely guilty plea, helpful during police enquiries), fines are frequently lowered 
(Sentencing Guidelines Council 2008). As a result, sanctions may be too low to act as 
an effective deterrent when the economics of committing a criminal offence are taken 
into account (e.g. high returns, and low probability of detection and conviction) 
(Robinson et al. 2010). For example, in 2000, an offender prosecuted under COTES 
for possessing 138 shahtoosh shawls made from the hair of Tibetan antelope 
(Pantholops hodgsonii), listed on Appendix I of CITES was fined £1500; the 
estimated value of the shawls was £353,000.  
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The analysis was restricted by the data. For example, when setting sentences, 
magistrates must consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as well as the 
offenders’ financial circumstances. Such information was not available making it 
problematic to fully model actual sentencing decisions. Most offences prosecuted in 
the UK during the period covered by this study involved birds. This does not 
necessarily reflect the types of crimes being committed but may reflect available data 
sources, and perhaps differences in the probabilities of detection and prosecution. 
Police Wildlife Crime Officers now exist in most UK police forces, and the RSPB 
promote the reporting of suspected bird-related crimes (RSPB 2011) and have an 
investigation team which works together with the National Wildlife Crime Unit, police 
forces, and other agencies to help catch wildlife criminals. Conversely, Her Majesty’s 
Customs and Excise, responsible for enforcing the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations no 
longer have designated CITES Wildlife and Endangered Species Officers in each 
customs region (House of Commons 2004). Instead they have adopted an 
intelligence-led approach and depend heavily upon a small team of CITES specialists 
based at Heathrow Airport (House of Commons 2004). The number of prosecutions 
involving taxa other than birds was too low to allow me to investigate the impact of 
taxon on sanction severity. As such it is unknown if the level of charisma associated 
with different taxa influenced sentencing decisions as it has been shown to influence 
other factors such as donor support (Sergio et al. 2006). However, results from 
Chapter 5 suggest that such an influence is unlikely to be present. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the topic, obtaining reliable information on the black market value 
of wildlife products is challenging (Stiles and Martin 2001), yet in the absence of such 
information, it is impossible to investigate how sanctions relate to the potential 
profits that criminals stand to make from their illicit trade. Gaining data on black 
market values requires further attention if this relationship is to be understood.  
6.5 Conclusion 
Reducing wildlife crime may be critical to the survival of many species. Results 
suggest that judiciaries consider the conservation impact of wildlife crimes when 
sentencing wildlife criminals (both the protection status, and whether a crime 
involved single, or multiple specimens, influenced sanctioning). However, concern 
remains as to how sanctions relate to the illegal profits, and therefore how effective 
current sanctioning is at deterring wildlife crimes, particularly those which are highly 
profitable.  
 
Chapter 6. Do sanctions reflect conservation impact? 
90 
 
  
 91 
 
Chapter 7. Discussion 
Chapter 7. Discussion 
92 
 
7.1 Background 
Globally human activities including deforestation, land-use change, and the burning 
of fossil fuels exert such sizeable impacts upon the Earth that they rival some forces 
of Nature. The impact of our activities is so great that the epoch in which we live has 
been described as the Anthropocene (Crutzen 2002; Steffen et al. 2011). In some 
instances resource use is illegal. Over time, different types of interventions have 
been implemented in an attempt to curb transgressions. For example, protected 
areas have adopted fences and fines approaches, using guards to monitor prohibited 
access, distributing penalties to rule breakers, whilst integrated conservation and 
development projects have offered alternatives sources of sustenance or income in 
an attempt to reduce illegal offtake (Barrett and Arcese 1995). Whatever the 
approach, one factor is central: success depends upon influencing environmentally 
harmful behaviours committed by people.  
 
7.2 Contributions of this thesis 
When I started this PhD I felt that studying rule breaking in conservation was 
somehow taboo. To suggest that people living near natural resources that various 
conservation bodies and authorities were promoting the conservation of might be 
breaking rules seemingly contradicts the dominant ethos of the various community-
centred approaches to conservation. Particularly as such approaches may tend to 
promote the image of local people willingly engaging in pro-conservation behaviours, 
whilst refraining from environmentally harmful ones. However, many approaches to 
conservation and natural resource management, including relatively new initiatives 
such as payment for ecosystem services schemes depend upon rules (Sommerville et 
al. 2010) and require information about compliance. Recently there has been greater 
discussion of rules and rule breaking in the conservation and natural resource 
management literature (Blank and Gavin 2009; Gavin et al. 2010; Keane et al. 2008; 
Robinson et al. 2010; Solomon et al. 2007), and this thesis contributes to research in 
this area. 
 
Part One 
Understanding human behaviour  
This thesis has reviewed theories of human decision making from social psychology, 
discussing the types of predictors used to investigate drivers of human behaviour, 
and how such predictors have been studied in conservation and natural resource 
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management. Chapter 2 draws together a broad span of research from within 
conservation covering work on social norms and taboos, as well as research on 
attitudes of people subjected to conservation interventions including community 
conservation programmes and protected area rules. The key contribution of this 
chapter has been to offer clarification as to why research into general attitudes in 
conservation has produced mixed evidence of the relationship between attitudes and 
behaviour. Drawing on lessons learned in social psychology Chapter 2 offers 
suggestions on how research in this area may be improved to produce results which 
may usefully inform the design of interventions aimed at influencing behaviour. For 
example by identifying which underlying beliefs (attitude, social influences, or 
perceived and actual availability of resources) best explains someone’s intention to 
perform, or refrain from performing, a specific behaviour which will impact upon 
conservation success. My suggestions that data collection on attitude may be 
improved by investigating attitude towards a specific behaviour of conservation 
interest (e.g. poaching), rather than towards conservation in general; more 
specifically defining the behaviour of interest in terms of target, action, context, and 
timescale; and linking attitudes to an actual measure of behaviour were empirically 
tested in Chapter 4.  
 
There is evidence, both within and beyond our field, that attitude alone is a poor 
predictor of peoples’ behaviour (Infield and Namara 2001; Waylen et al. 2009). As 
such, if the intention is to conduct research that may inform the design of 
interventions aimed at influencing behaviour, studies making the assumption that 
general attitudes (towards a species, habitat, project or other conservation-related 
topic) are useful proxy indicators of pro-conservation behaviour are redundant. 
Moving forward, studies should strive to establish the link between drivers of decision 
making such as people’s attitudes and norms, and their actual engagement, or 
intention to engage in specific behaviours which impact upon the success of 
conservation objectives. For example, Cavalcanti et al. (2010) use the theory of 
planned behaviour (TPB) to investigate the relative importance of social psychological 
drivers of behaviour at predicting peoples’ intention to kill jaguar (Pantera onca) in 
the northern Pantanal, Brazil. Whilst Williams et al. (in review) use the TPB as a 
theoretical framework to assess the impact of training (which aimed to encourage the 
cultivation of an over-harvested palm species xaté (Chamaedorea ernesti-augusti)), 
to examine which factors (attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, 
and knowledge) determine peoples’ actual cultivation of xaté in forest-edge 
communities in Belize. The results of Cavalcanti et al. (2010) suggest that the social 
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acceptability of, and attitudes towards jaguar killing were both important predictors 
of peoples’ intention to perform an environmentally harmful behaviour – killing 
jaguars. However, the results of Williams et al. (in review) suggest that respondents’ 
technical knowledge and perceived behavioural control, along with factors such as 
forest-ownership, were important predictors of the pro-conservation behaviour of 
xaté cultivation. Note, the relative importance of the drivers of human decision 
making differed from one behaviour to another. It cannot be assumed that a) 
attitude alone is a useful predictor of behaviour, or b) that attitude is the most useful 
predictor of behaviour. 
Novel methods for assessing rule breaking 
An important contribution of this thesis has been to test novel methods for directly 
assessing rule breaking in conservation by asking members of the public, some of 
whom may be rule breakers, to respond to sensitive questions. Rarely do studies 
measuring illegal resource use compare results from different methods (Gavin et al. 
2010). In Chapter 3 I compared the level of reported rule breaking using three 
methods: an anonymous self-complete questionnaire, the nominative technique, and 
the randomised response technique (RRT). Both the nominative technique and RRT 
have been used in other disciplines to estimate the prevalence of sensitive 
behaviours (e.g. drug abuse, and illegal abortions) but rarely have such specialised 
methods been used to investigate rule breaking in conservation where there has 
been a tendency to depend upon questionnaires delivered through face-to-face 
interviews (Table 3.1, Chapter 3). Studying rule breaking by local fly fishers provided 
an ideal opportunity to test different methods of directly assessing rule breaking. The 
nominative technique, previously only used to investigate illegal drug use (Miller 
1985) did not perform well. However, as reported in other comparative studies, I 
found that RRT returned significantly higher estimates of rule breaking than did the 
anonymous self-complete questionnaire. This suggests that whilst anonymity may 
increase reporting, other mechanisms can further increase the validity of sensitive 
data. As explained in Chapter 3, the principle disadvantage of RRT is that compared 
to conventional methods, RRT requires larger sample sizes to get estimates with an 
acceptable level of error (due to random noise added to the data by instructing a 
known proportion of respondents to provide forced responses). However, my results 
suggest that this compromise in efficiency is more than compensated for by the 
apparent increase in data validity. 
 
Results presented in Chapter 3 suggest that considerable revenue may be being lost 
to the Environment Agency as a result of fishers failing to comply with the legal 
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requirement to hold a valid rod license. Results also suggest that revenue is being 
lost by fishery owners as some fisher’s abuse the requirement to pay for each day of 
fishing. Armed with such information authorities and managers can decide upon the 
most appropriate and viable course of action to improve compliance. However, in the 
absence of information on rule breaking natural resource managers have a restricted 
ability to enforce rules efficiently, for example through targeted enforcement 
interventions or increasing knowledge of rules. However, as discussed in this thesis 
(Chapters 3 and 4), investigating sensitive topics directly by surveying members of 
the public, is problematic, being subject to social desirability and non-response 
biases. Developed in the social sciences (Warner 1965) RRT is one example of a risk-
reducing method designed specifically for gathering sensitive data directly from 
people which, in comparative studies (Solomon et al. 2007; Chapter 3 of this thesis), 
and validation studies (Tracy and Fox 1981; Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b) 
outperforms conventional anonymous survey techniques. The apparent gains in data 
validity achieved through RRT suggest that the method could be more widely used to 
gather information on rule breaking in conservation, for example studies of poaching. 
However, future applications of RRT could be more efficient than the one applied in 
Chapter 3. In this study respondents were instructed to answer the sensitive 
question when one die landed on 1, 2, 3, or 4, and to say ‘yes’ when the die landed 
on 5, and to say ‘no’ when it landed on 6. Therefore the probability of respondents 
being required to answer the sensitive question was 4/6 or 0.667. Increasing the 
probability of respondents answering the sensitive question increases the efficiency 
of RRT as a greater proportion of respondents are required to answer the sensitive 
question. However, setting the probability too high, for example above 0.75, which is 
the probability associated with answering sensitive questions in Chapter 4, may 
eliminate the protection perceived by respondents participating in RRT surveys. 
Identifying potential non-sensitive indicators of involvement in illegal 
behaviours 
Despite the promise of the few studies which have used RRT to estimate levels of 
rule breaking in conservation and natural resource management (e.g. Blank and 
Gavin 2009; Solomon et al. 2007; and Chapter 3 of this thesis) the application of 
RRT has been limited to assessing the population-level prevalence of sensitive 
behaviours and has not linked characteristics of people, such as their attitudes, xaté 
to their actual behaviour. As a result, identifying groups of people (for example, 
those who hold negative attitudes towards carnivores on their land) to target with 
interventions aimed at changing behaviour remains problematic. Chapter 4 of this 
thesis took a major step forward, paving the way for using RRT to test the 
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effectiveness of innocuous questions at identifying people’s involvement in illicit 
behaviours. The research on carnivore persecution presented in Chapter 4 is novel on 
a number of accounts: drawing on lesson from social psychology, behaviour specific 
attitude statements (as suggested in Chapter 2) were developed in order to 
empirically test the relationship between a person’s attitude, and their involvement in 
the sensitive behaviour under investigation (reported via RRT). The effectiveness of 
how sensitive behaviours were perceived to be in respect of prevailing social norms 
was also tested as an indicator of behaviour. In addition, this was the first study 
within conservation and natural resource management to test the potential of the 
psychological bias known as the false consensus effect (Ross et al. 1977) at 
indicating a person’s involvement in sensitive activities. In addition to providing 
estimates of the proportion of farmers killing carnivores (including the legally 
protected leopard (Panthera pardus) and brown hyaena (Parahyaena brunnea)) on 
their ranches, results of Chapter 4 provide evidence that clearly specified attitude 
statements can be a useful indicator of behaviour. Further, data from this study 
supports the suggestion by Petroczi et al. (2008) that a person’s estimate of the 
proportion of their peers involved in sensitive behaviours can be a useful indicator of 
a person’s own involvement in that behaviour.  
 
The identification of non-sensitive indicators of people’s involvement in illicit 
behaviours is an initial step towards identifying innocuous questions, the answers to 
which can be related to people’s involvement in illegal or otherwise sensitive 
behaviours. Armed with information on innocuous characteristics of people most 
likely to break rules, resource managers may better direct their limited resources 
towards influencing non-compliant behaviour. This is not to say that respondents 
could be individually profiled and targeted with interventions such as penalties for 
rule breaking. Even if this were possible (it is not via RRT), such action could be 
viewed as an unethical abuse of trust between researcher and respondent. Rather, 
information concerning social psychological characteristics associated with behaviour, 
for example negative attitudes towards carnivores, may be used to inform the design 
of interventions designed specifically to influence characteristics (e.g. attitude) 
associated with driving environmentally harmful behaviours, which should ultimately 
influence behaviour. Examples of effective interventions include social marketing 
campaigns (Jenks et al 2010). Non-sensitive indicators of peoples’ involvement in 
illicit behaviours may be used to identify particular demographics associated with rule 
breaking, facilitating the effective targeting of interventions. However, if the group of 
people under investigation, for example farmers, are diverse with many sub-groups 
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represented (e.g. many farm types) each sub-group must be sampled adequately for 
RRT to achieve estimates with acceptable levels of error. 
Part Two 
Sanctioning wildlife crimes 
Incentives appeal to the innate desire that people have to improve themselves by 
seeking pleasure and avoiding pain; for example government subsidies may provide 
positive incentives for specific behaviours (e.g. agri-environment schemes), whereas 
penalties for crimes provide negative incentives aimed at persuading people to 
comply with regulations (van Vugt 2009). However, sanctions can be 
counterproductive if they are considered unfair, as such, in addition to reflecting how 
serious a crime was, sanctions should be socially acceptable, for this reason public 
and professional opinions on sentencing are often consulted (Roberts et al. 2009; 
Sentencing Council 2011). In Chapter 5 I used conjoint analysis to investigate which 
aspect of wildlife trade crimes conservationists, magistrates and the public 
considered most important when sentencing hypothetical wildlife trade crimes. Whilst 
most frequently used in marketing to investigate which attributes of a product are 
most desirable to consumers, I have shown how conjoint analysis can be a useful 
tool for investigating differences between groups of people, and their perspectives on 
policy issues such as aspects of crimes and defendants considered at sentencing. 
 
My results suggest that the way in which magistrates assess how serious a wildlife 
crime was, is in keeping with public opinion towards wildlife crime and that 
magistrates assess how serious such crimes are in the same manner in which they 
assess more commonly prosecuted crimes for which sentencing guidelines exist. 
They place considerable importance upon the illegal profits that wildlife criminals 
stand to make from their involvement in illicit trading. However, in many countries 
there has been concern that sanctions for wildlife crimes, including the illegal trade in 
wildlife and its products, do not reflect how serious wildlife crimes are in terms of the 
illegal profits to be made or the threat status of species involved (Chaber et al. 2010; 
Eagle and Betters 1998).That said, wildlife crime in general is under-researched and 
there is an apparent lack of empirical analysis testing these assumptions. As such in 
Chapter 6 I reviewed sanctions awarded in the United Kingdom for wildlife crimes 
prosecuted over a 23 year period. Due to a paucity of data on the black market value 
of wildlife and wildlife products, it was not possible to investigate the relationship of 
sanctions with the potential profit to be made from wildlife crimes. However, it was 
possible to investigate the relationship of sanctions with the protection status 
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afforded to different species. My results suggest that magistrates and judges 
consider the protection status of the species involved in wildlife crimes when passing 
sentences. Harsher sentences were awarded for crimes involving CITES Appendix I 
species compared to crimes involving CITES Appendix II species, or offences under 
the Wildlife and Countryside Act. Further, harsher sanctions were awarded for 
offences under the WCA involving multiple, compared to single specimens, 
suggesting that magistrates were using their sentencing powers to award sanctions 
in respect of each single specimen (e.g. bird, nest, or egg) for which an offence has 
been committed, as if each where a separate crime.  
 
Only by improving our knowledge of criminal sentencing procedures through 
empirical research may conservationists understand if judiciaries are in need of 
further information to assist in awarding sanctions which may ultimately deter wildlife 
crime. Currently it is unclear how frequently magistrates are provided with adequate 
information concerning illegal profits made from wildlife crimes. The relationship 
between threat status and sanction severity shown in the data analysed for Chapter 
6 of this thesis suggests that information on threat status is reaching the courts. 
However, these data also suggest that information regarding illegal profits is rarely 
known. For example only 5.5% (n = 696) of wildlife crime prosecutions analysed for 
Chapter 6 had financial values associated with them. However, Chapter 6 analysed 
information on wildlife crime prosecutions as recorded by wildlife NGOs, it did not 
analyse the actual information presented in court, which may differ. In order to 
improve the degree of understanding as to how frequently magistrates are provided 
with sufficient information on crime characteristics it would be beneficial to review 
the contents of a sample of cases as they were presented in court. Completing such a 
review will clarify the types of wildlife crime characteristics that are generally 
presented in court and if any characteristics relevant to sentencing are currently 
omitted. If it becomes evident that courts are rarely presented with sufficient 
information on which to base their sentencing decisions, which should include 
consideration of illegal profits, action may be taken to improve the situation. As an 
initial step the National Wildlife Crime Unit in the United Kingdom could be consulted 
in order to understand the current state of knowledge with respect to illegal profits 
made from wildlife crimes.  
 
7.3 Implications for research 
This thesis has made some suggestions as to how research into social psychological 
drivers of human decision making including people’s attitudes and how attitudes 
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relate to behaviour, may be improved making such studies more useful for 
management purposes (Chapter 2). Using RRT, a method specifically designed for 
investigating sensitive topics, this thesis has estimated the prevalence of a range of 
sensitive and illegal behaviours in conservation (Chapters 3 and 4). This thesis has 
also shown how RRT can be adapted to investigate innocuous indicators of 
involvement in illegal or otherwise sensitive behaviours (Chapter 4). However, whilst 
evidence from validation studies suggests that RRT returns more accurate reports of 
peoples’ involvement in sensitive behaviours compared to conventional survey 
techniques (Tracy and Fox 1981; Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005b), underreporting 
cannot be ruled out. Understanding the level of underreporting (or put another way, 
‘how close to the truth are RRT estimates?’), is an interesting area of research still 
open to investigation. 
 
Validation studies for RRT require information concerning the true status of each 
individual in respect of a sensitive behaviour, for example police arrest records, and 
access to each individual. Difficulties associated with accessing such information 
means that validation studies are rare. However, using common pool resource games 
(Ostrom et al. 1994) in which players have the chance to make money (e.g. Travers 
et al. 2011) it may be possible to experimentally create a validation study. For 
example players, self-reporting their own behaviour thus providing records of true 
status required of validation studies, may be told that there is a communal resource 
from which they may all extract. Each player may extract between 0 and x units of 
the resource from the common pool containing 100 units of the resource. For every 
unit extracted, individual players receive a set price (e.g. £1.00 per unit) and for 
every unit remaining in the common pool everyone in the group receives a set price 
(e.g. 10p per unit) representing the value of the resource to future extraction. After 
playing a number of rounds of such a game an enforcement treatment (whereby 
players know the probability of being detected if they break rules, and fines are 
awarded) may be introduced making all extraction illegal (Travers et al. 2011); this 
creates the opportunity for rule breaking to occur. After participating in the games 
but prior to receiving payment, players could be asked to report their game-play via 
RRT. The topic is sensitive because players who broke rules, but where not detected 
and fined, may perceive that telling the truth holds consequences, revealing their 
rule breaking could result in their payments being subjected to fines. Players’ 
behaviour as reported via RRT could later be compared to their self-reported game 
play. Artificially creating such a validation study would require experimentation, with 
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consideration given to the size of the financial incentive required to induce the 
necessary rule breaking. 
 
Few studies have used computers to deliver RRT surveys despite evidence to suggest 
that respondents feel that computers give them extra privacy (Lensvelt and Boeije 
2007). Where computer-literacy and access is considered sufficient, online RRT 
surveys could be a viable method for accessing large numbers of respondents. 
However, careful piloting would be required to ensure that respondents trust the 
computerised randomising device and follow survey instructions particularly in the 
absence of a researcher. If successful, the development of computerised RRT surveys 
addressing conservation and natural resource management issues could become a 
cost-effective method for accessing widely dispersed respondents. However, RRT is 
just one method which addresses the inherent difficulties of asking people sensitive 
questions and it is currently unknown if over time respondents will become 
desensitised to the technique if asked to complete multiple surveys applying the 
method. To this end it is important to continue to learn from other disciplines as 
there may be other methods which can be adapted to fulfil the needs of research into 
assessing sensitive behaviours in conservation. One method which holds potential for 
estimating the prevalence of sensitive behaviours is the unmatched count technique 
which has been used across a range of sensitive behaviours including rule breaking 
by auctioneers (Dalton et al. 1994), and anti-gay hate crime (Rayburn et al. 2003). 
This method requires two groups of respondents: without identifying which 
behaviours they do, group A report how many of the behaviours presented to them 
on a list they perform, this list includes one sensitive behaviour; Group B also report 
how many behaviours on the list that they perform, the list is the same except the 
sensitive behaviour is omitted. The proportion of people engaged in the sensitive 
behaviour is the difference in the mean number of behaviours reported by the two 
groups (Tourangeau and Yan 2007). The implicit association test (IAT) which has 
been used to investigate people’s implicit attitudes towards a number of sensitive 
behaviours including people’s sexual orientation (Banse et al. 2001) and racial 
prejudice (McConnell and Liebold 2001) offers potential as an indicator of people’s 
involvement in sensitive behaviours. IAT requires respondents to categorise stimuli 
which appear on a screen as instructed. For example in a study investigating racism 
Greenwald et al. (1998) instructed participants to categorise a list of names as being 
typically for black or white people. They were then required to associate a variety of 
pleasant words (e.g. miracle) with the names of black people, and a variety of 
unpleasant words (e.g. ‘evil’) with the names of white people. The tasks are then 
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reversed. The difference in the time taken to complete these exercises reveals 
respondents’ underlying evaluation of the topic, i.e. their implicit attitudes (Fazio and 
Olson 2003). Greenwald et al. (1998) reported that respondents were quicker to 
associate negative words with the names of black people, than they were to 
associate them with white people, indicating a degree of racism in the study group.  
 
With the exception of one study identified below (Ana Nuno; in prep), these methods 
do not appear to have been applied to behaviours of interest to conservation and 
natural resource management. In order to understand if the validity of data obtained 
from such methods is greater than that obtained from conventional survey 
instruments used to directly estimate sensitive behaviours, comparative studies (e.g. 
Chapter 3) are required (Gavin et al. 2010). Further, if indicators such as implicit 
attitudes (e.g. from IAT studies) are to be suggested as proxy indicators of people’s 
involvement in illicit behaviours, attempts must be made to link indicators to reports 
of behaviour (perhaps obtained via RRT, or another risk-reducing method) as done in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
As a way forward, a wider body of empirical data from a variety of case studies are 
needed. To this end efforts are already underway. For example the unmatched count 
technique is being used to investigate illegal resource extraction from the Serengeti 
National Park, Tanzania (Ana Nuno; in prep) and illegal behaviours have been 
incorporated into choice experiments investigating household decision making (Nick 
Hanley; in prep). With respect to the latter study, it will be interesting to see how 
effective choice experiments are at elucidating information about house decision 
making once a sensitive behaviour has been incorporated.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis contribute to the understanding of wildlife crime 
sanctioning in an established judicial system. I hope that these chapters improve 
conservationist’s appreciation of the multitude of factors considered by judiciaries 
when assessing how serious a crime was, and deciding upon appropriate sanctions. 
Setting sentences is not as clear cut as it may seem and the apparently low fines 
awarded for some wildlife crimes may be the result of factors which must be 
considered at sentencing (e.g. an offender’s ability to pay) rather than evidence that 
judiciaries do not consider wildlife crimes to be serious offences. Whilst it has been 
possible to investigate how sanctions relate to the conservation impact of wildlife 
crimes (Chapter 6), the paucity of reliable data on black market values of wildlife 
products prevented an analysis of the relationship between sanction severity and 
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illegal profits. Those who have reported black market values for wildlife products 
have generally obtained the information through informal discursive discussions with 
sellers, obtaining prices for a limited number of wildlife products in a variety of 
countries (e.g. Stiles and Martin 2001; Chaber et al. 2010). Given differences in data 
collection locations and techniques, including stages in markets that values represent 
(e.g. middle or end market) using data from published and grey literature may not 
be considered adequately robust for analysing how sanctions awarded in the United 
Kingdom relate to potential profits.  Given the difficulties associated with obtaining 
reliable black market values (and the considerable number of species involved) one 
option could be to request legal sale values from pet traders, falconers, taxidermists, 
and antiques dealers in the United Kingdom and to conduct an analysis of how 
sanctions relate to legal values of wildlife products. However, due to its nature, such 
an analysis would fail to account for inflated prices which may be paid on the black 
market for rare, highly valued specimens (Angulo et al. 2009).  
 
Wildlife crimes are frequently motivated by the considerable profits that unscrupulous 
individuals stand to make. Given the gravity that magistrates place on illegal profits 
when they are assessing crimes (Chapter 5) increased research in this area is 
urgently required so that judiciaries can be provided with adequate information to 
assess how serious wildlife crimes are. However, just as positive incentives have 
been shown to crowd out people’s motivations to engage in certain behaviours due to 
a sense of moral obligation (e.g. donating blood, Titmuss 1979), when negative 
incentives (e.g. punishing over-use) are perceived as unfair, they too can be 
counterproductive (e.g. if people perceive they pay dearly for running a car, they are 
more likely to believe they have the right to use it as much as they like) (van Vugt 
2009). What constitutes a fair and adequate sanction that will deter wildlife criminals 
is another area of research worthy of further investigation. 
 
7.4 Implications for policy 
Many approaches to biodiversity conservation depend upon rules which, to differing 
extents may restrict the spatial and temporal dimensions of resource extraction. For 
example, across the United Kingdom it is illegal to kill hen harriers (Circus cyaneus) 
throughout the year; whilst in England and Wales a national bylaw prohibits the 
killing of brown trout (Salmo trutta) during a 5.5 month closed season. In many 
instances quotas determine the level of offtake permitted and, because it is difficult 
to estimate animal population sizes and monitor changes over time, modelling has 
made an important contribution to understanding the influences of difference 
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management regimes on animal populations (Caro et al. 2009). However, in the 
absence of information on the levels of illegal resource extraction, quotas may be set 
too high; for extreme cases this could lead to population extinctions.  Whilst in some 
cultures it may be acceptable to divulge sensitive information irrespective of the 
manner in which it is requested, when investigating sensitive topics it is naive to 
expect respondents to provide honest answers when asked directly. Methods such as 
RRT have the potential to assess the extent of peoples’ involvement in illegal 
resource extraction. Such information can be incorporated into modelling approaches 
investigating the impact of management regimes on animal populations being used 
to inform resource management decisions and policy. Whilst there is some evidence 
that RRT can be adapted for use in communities with low literacy (Solomon et al. 
2007) a wider variety of case studies are needed in order to establish how broadly 
RRT may be applied to conservation and natural resource management problems. 
 
In the absence of adequate implementation, including enforcement, regulations are 
ineffective. The persistence of illegal wildlife trading globally suggests that the 
effectiveness of national and regional legislations developed to enact CITES are 
currently limited. Ultimately, as suggested to reduce the illegal exploitation of black 
rhinos (Diceros bicornis) and African elephants (Loxodonta Africana) in Luangwa 
Valley, Zambia (Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland 1993), reducing wildlife crimes 
may be most effectively achieved by increasing probabilities of detection rather than 
simply increasing the severity of sanctions. Indeed, poaching from the Seregeti 
National Park, Tanzania reduced following increased patrol effort (Hilborn et al. 
2006). However, investigating the level of resources that government-led 
management authorities allocate to enforcement can be difficult as authorities may 
not wish to reveal such information (indeed, my research permit for Tanzania was 
turned down because I was interested issues of enforcement). This has real 
implications for research efforts attempting to understand and inform policy in 
respect of law enforcement.  
 
Whilst authorities may be encouraged to collaborate with researchers interested in 
understanding how best to reduce wildlife crime within and across borders, 
researchers must learn to communicate beyond their disciplines and develop 
acceptable ways in which such topics may be investigated. Part 2 of this thesis 
applied a method developed in marketing to investigate sentencing decision of 
magistrates and together with an analysis of wildlife crime prosecutions held in the 
United Kingdom an important issue of policy relevance is now supported with 
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empirical evidence. Results of Chapter 5 provide evidence that magistrates place 
considerable weight upon the illegal profit made by criminals when making 
sentencing decisions, yet for wildlife crimes, such information may rarely be made 
available for consideration in court. As such, when preparing cases for court the 
Crown Prosecution Service should be encouraged to ensure that such information is 
available for presentation so that magistrates have appropriate information to assess 
how serious the wildlife crime was in terms that they can relate to. Further, the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council for England and Wales currently do not include 
guidance on how to process wildlife crimes in the Magistrates' Court Sentencing 
Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2008), the aim of which is to ensure 
consistency in sentencing across Magistrates’ Courts. Given that policy makers do not 
(or rarely) read papers in peer review journals, the publication of Chapter 5 in 
Environmental Conservation will not influence the content of the Magistrates’ Court 
Sentencing Guidelines. Instead, such an objective may be achieved through 
communication with the Crown Prosecution Service, the principal prosecuting 
authority in England and Wales, and attempts should be made to do so. Whilst a 
limited number of wildlife crimes may reach Magistrates’ Courts each year, they are 
frequently of a delicate nature due to the high level of public interest they receive, as 
such providing magistrates with the same degree of guidance that they receive for 
other more frequently processed crimes seems to be an appropriate 
recommendation. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
Just as conservationists do not find it acceptable to conduct poorly planned ecological 
monitoring, it should not be acceptable to conduct poor social science research. Most 
conservationists trained in the biological sciences, and whilst there is an implicit 
understanding that the biggest threat to biodiversity and successful conservation is 
human behaviour, many conservationists lack training in the social sciences (Adams 
2007). As few human led drivers of biodiversity loss show signs of slowing in the 
near future (Ehrlich and Pringle 2008), we must act promptly. To this end an efficient 
approach would be to learn from other disciplines. Several disciplines offer models of 
human decision-making, and opportunities to collaborate with researchers from other 
disciplines including anthropology, economics, social psychology are increasingly 
available. Expanding our knowledge beyond traditional academic boundaries will 
enhance our ability to develop a conservation science more attuned to the complex 
array of factors influencing human decision making at individual and societal levels. 
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Appendix 1. Fly fisher surveys 
Fly fisher survey protocol 
I am PhD student from Bangor University. As part of my research I am testing 
different methods of asking people questions. I do not record any personal 
information so you do not need to worry about ending up on any junk mail lists. 
The survey that I am doing today concerns fly fishing. Please would you take 
some time to help me by completing this short survey? 
Yes 
Today I am testing three different methods. Inside the bag there are three balls, 
each is marked with a different colour which corresponds to a one of three methods. 
To determine which one you should complete please pick one table tennis ball from 
this bag and show me what colour mark is on it: 
YELLOW = RRT 
GREEN = Self-complete 
BLUE = Nominative 
RRT protocol 
OK. You have chosen yellow. This is a fun method that follows rules, as if we were 
playing a game. First we will do an example. [Give respondent (R) mug with die in it 
and example Question (Q) card]. The rules of this method ensure that you remain 
anonymous, I can never trace you answers back to you. Let’s do the example. First, 
put your hand over the top of the mug and shake the die, have a look, what number 
did it land on? OK, the die has landed on X, now let’s read the rules, [read rules off 
example card]. Your die landed on X, so following the rules you must [complete 
sentence depending upon result of die throw]. Now, when we do the actual survey 
you will not tell me, or show me what the die lands on, that is your secret. The only 
thing that you will say to me is ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ by following the rules of the game. I am 
going to mark your answers on this sheet [show mark sheet to R]. Is that clear to 
you or would you like to do the example again? [do example again if requested, 
swopping roles if R seems to lack trust]. Ok, now let’s do the survey. Remember to 
follow the rules, they are written on every card so you do not need to remember 
them. [Ask RRT Qs 1 – 7]. Thank you, I would just like to finish by asking you a few 
very short questions – ask Qs 1 – 5 on RRT mark sheet.  
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Once survey is completed: Thank you, now I have been asking you lots of questions, 
is there anything you would like to ask me?  
Self-complete protocol 
Ok. You have chosen green. This method is a quick questionnaire which I will ask you 
to fill out yourself. You are not required to write your name or other personal 
details on the questionnaire. I will give you an envelope to seal your completed 
questionnaire in. Once you have finished, please place your sealed envelope in 
the locked box. [Give R clip board with questionnaire, pen and envelope. Show 
R where box is to put completed survey into]. 
Once R has dropped their envelope into the box: Thank you for taking the time to 
complete my survey. Do you have any questions you would like to ask me?  
 
Nominative protocol 
OK, you have chosen blue. This method is based around you answering questions 
about your close friends. I am not going to ask you to name them, nor am I 
going to record your name or personal details. I am now going to ask you a 
series of questions and I will record the answers on this form. It will only take 
us a few minutes to complete this survey [start nominative questionnaire]. 
Once survey is completed: Thank you, now I have been asking you lots of 
questions, is there anything you would like to ask me? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The font sizes of the RRT cards and surveys show within this Appendix have 
been reduced for the purpose of inclusion in this thesis. Actual RRT cards and surveys 
were produced in larger font sizes so that they were easy for respondents to read.
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Appendix 2. South Africa farmer / rancher survey 
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Appendix 3. Model selection, supplementary material 
Section 1 
The generalised linear mixed-effects model (GLMM) upon which our results are based 
was fitted by penalised quasi-likelihood (PQL) using the glmmPQL function from the 
MASS package (Venables and Ripley 2002) in R version 2.12.0 (R Development Core 
Team 2010) with a custom link function. This choice was dictated by several 
considerations: 
We wished to be able to use mixed-effect models since they are generally able to 
make more efficient use of grouped data than alternative approaches which analyse 
such data separately (see Gelman and Hill (2007), for a discussion). 
Any model of data arising from randomised response surveys must account for the 
bias and additional variation introduced by the random responses (van den Hout et 
al. 2007). To the best of our knowledge, none of the standard statistical packages 
currently includes functions which are able to do this. 
Following van den Hout et al. (2007), we chose to take advantage of R’s flexible 
nature to modify an existing model-fitting function to accept RRT data: glmmPQL is 
one of the few available functions for fitting GLMMs which can readily be modified to 
accept the custom link function required to analyse RRT data (Venables and Ripley 
2002). 
Although PQL is a flexible approach and has been widely applied, the use of quasi-
likelihood drastically constrains the options that are available for model selection. The 
most widely accepted criteria for model selection – likelihood ratio tests and AIC – 
both require models which produce true likelihoods. Analogues based on quasi-
likelihoods, such as quasi-AIC, have been suggested (see e.g. Lebreton et al., 1992; 
Richards, 2007), but lack a solid theoretical basis.  
We therefore adopted a procedure where we first fit a series of GLMs separately for 
each species. AIC was calculated for each model and the models were ranked within 
each species set. The best fitting model was considered to be the one with the 
smallest AIC value (Burnham and Anderson 2002). The structures of best fitting 
models for each species and their effect estimates were then compared. If they had 
differed significantly we would have concluded that different structures were 
appropriate for each species and drawn inferences from the single-species models. 
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However, in this case the structures of the best fitting models were identical so we 
proceeded to fit a GLMM with this fixed effect structure and a random effect for the 
individual respondent, using data from all four species together. Finally, we 
compared the effect estimates derived from the fitted GLMM to those obtained from 
the single species GLMs as a simple check on the robustness of our findings. Gelman 
and Hill (2007) suggest that a series of GLMs such as this is analogous to an extreme 
case of a GLMM in which there is no “pooling” of information within the grouping 
variable (in this case, the individual respondent). We observed a reasonably close 
match between the results of the GLMs and the GLMM, suggesting that the degree of 
pooling was relatively low. In addition, by selecting the model structure based upon 
the single species GLMs (which were each fitted using only a quarter of the total 
data) we believe that the selected model will tend to be conservative in terms of 
model complexity. This approach, although ad hoc, was chosen as a pragmatic 
compromise between the desire to make efficient use of the data and the limitations 
of the available software. 
Table 1. Generalised linear model selection using Akaike's Information Criterion 
 
Attitude 
towards 
killing 
Farmers’ 
estimate
s of 
peer-
behavio
ur 
Questio
n 
sensitivi
ty 
Leopard 
∆ AIC 
Caracal 
∆ AIC 
Jackal ∆ 
AIC 
Snake ∆ 
AIC 
Model 1 Y Y Y 0 0 0 0 
Model 2 X Y Y 2.90 2.97 3.81 3.19 
Model 3 Y Y X 5.49 7.16 6.24 5.05 
Model 4 X Y X 10.03 9.69 8.20 9.38 
Model 5 Y X Y 16.39 9.43 11.77 2.59 
Model 6 X X Y 18.81 13.28 18.29 6.74 
Model 7 Y X X 20.87 17.04 17.90 9.40 
 
  
Appendix 3 
141 
 
 
Figure 1. Parameter estimates for single species generalised linear models and the 
generalised linear mixed model incorporating all species and respondents’ identity as 
a random effect. Positive parameter estimates correspond to a higher probability that 
a species would be killed by a farmer. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Appendix 5. EU wildlife trade annexes and CITES  
The European Union Wildlife Trade Regulation (EC) No. 338/97 Annexes and related 
CITES Appendices 
EU Annex EU Annex includes: Notes on CITES Appendices  
Annex A 
Import permits 
required at first 
point of 
introduction to 
the EU. Export 
or re-export 
permits 
required, when 
exporting 
outside of the 
EU. 
All CITES Appendix I 
species. 
 
Some CITES Appendix II 
and III species, for which 
the EU has adopted 
stricter domestic 
measures. 
 
Some non-CITES species. 
Appendix I: lists species that are the 
most endangered among CITES-listed 
animals and plants. CITES prohibits 
international trade in specimens of 
these species except when the 
purpose of the import is not 
commercial, for instance for scientific 
research. In these exceptional cases, 
trade may take place provided it is 
authorised by the granting of both an 
import permit and an export permit, 
or re-export certificate. 
Annex B 
Import permits 
required at first 
point of 
introduction to 
the EU. Export 
or re-export 
permits 
required, when 
exporting 
outside of the 
EU. 
All other CITES Appendix 
II species. 
 
Some CITES Appendix III 
species. 
 
Some non-CITES species. 
 
Appendix II: lists species that are 
not necessarily now threatened with 
extinction but that may become so 
unless trade is closely controlled. 
International trade in specimens of 
Appendix II species may be 
authorised by the granting of an 
export permit or re-export certificate. 
No import permit is required but 
importation is only permitted if a valid 
export permit or re-export certificate 
exists (although some countries have 
stricter measures than CITES 
requires). 
Annex C 
Certificate of 
origin required 
at first point of 
introduction to 
the EU. Export 
or re-export 
permits 
required, when 
exporting 
outside of the 
EU. 
All other CITES Appendix 
III species. 
 
Appendix III: lists species at the 
request of Parties already regulating 
trade in the species and needs the 
cooperation of other countries to 
prevent unsustainable or illegal 
exploitation. Exporting Appendix III 
specimens from a state where they 
are included on Appendix III requires 
an export permit; importation 
requires a certificate of origin. Re-
export certificate also needed if 
specimen is to be re-exported. 
Annex D 
Import 
notifications 
required at first 
Some CITES Appendix III 
species for which the EU 
holds a reservation. 
 
Parties to CITES can enter 
‘reservations’ with respect to any 
species listed in the Appendices.  
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point of 
introduction to 
the EU. 
Some non-CITES species. 
 
